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ABSTRACT 
Computer Forensics is concerned with the use of computer investigation and 
analysis techniques in order to collect evidence suitable for presentation in court. The 
examination of volatile memory is a relatively new but important area in computer 
forensics. More recently criminals are becoming more forensically aware and are now 
able to compromise computers without accessing the hard disk of the target computer. 
This means that traditional incident response practice of pulling the plug will destroy the 
only evidence of the crime. While some techniques are available for acquiring the 
contents of main memory, few exist which can analyze these data in a meaningful way. 
One reason for this is how memory is managed by the operating system. Data belonging 
to one process can be distributed arbitrarily across physical memory or the hard disk, 
making it very difficult to recover useful information. This report will focus on how these 
disparate sources of information can be combined to give a single, contiguous address 
space for each process. Using address translation a tool is developed to reconstruct the 
virtual address space of a process by combining a physical memory dump with the page-
file on the hard disk.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. CYBER CRIME 
Security experts say that there was an alarming rise in the number of sophisticated 
attacks recorded in 2006. They were made possible, partly, due to a large increase in the 
number of vulnerabilities identified in popular software applications because last year 
brought a sharp increase in the number of software security vulnerabilities discovered and 
actively exploited by attackers. In 2006, Microsoft Corp. issued 97 security related 
patches that the company designated "critical", meaning attackers could use them to 
exploit vulnerable machines. In comparison, Microsoft issued only 37 critical updates in 
2005. Also, fourteen of last year's critical flaws were "zero day" threats, meaning 
Microsoft first learned about the bugs only after they were already being exploited.  
Another alarming development is the level of sophistication attackers are now 
using to develop their attacks.  Some exploits are able to reside exclusively in volatile 
memory without ever accessing the hard drive. When a piece of software can do this it 
will leave no evidence on the system once it is shutdown.  One exception to this is if 
pieces of the process are paged to the disk.  However, at the time of writing the paging 
file structure is not fully understood. Research has been done to increase the information 
that the paging file can provide, but further investigation is required to understand what 
can be obtained using it. The harsh reality is that without evidence of its activity and 
origin, authorities have no way of stopping these attacks. Also, researchers fear that 
attacks will become even more advanced in 2008. "Criminals have gone from trying to 
hit as many machines as possible to focusing on techniques that allow them to remain 
undetected on infected machines longer," Symantec's Weafer said.  
Some software security vendors suspect that a new Trojan horse program, dubbed 
"Rustock.B" by some anti-virus companies, may serve as the template for future malware 
attacks. The program modifies itself slightly each time it installs on a new machine to 
evade detection by anti-virus software. In addition, it hides in the deep in the Windows© 
operating system, creates invisible copies of itself, and refuses to run under common 
malware analysis tools to resist identification and analysis by security researchers. "This 
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is about the nastiest piece of malware we've ever seen, and we're going to be seeing more 
of it," said Alex Eckelberry, president of Clearwater, Florida-based security vendor 
Sunbelt Software. "The new threats that we saw in 2006 have shown us that the malware 
authors are ingenious and creative in their methods. Unfortunately, those attributes aren't 
ones we would normally consider laudable in the context of criminals." 
B. MOTIVATION 
Computer Forensics is a field concerned with the use of tools and techniques to 
locate and collect digital evidence to be used in court. Evidence might be collected during 
and after a crime or misuse. [1] Such evidence may be found in both logical (files, 
caches, buffers, etc.) and physical places (hard disks, CDs/DVDs, removable media, main 
memory, etc.). While collecting evidence, Anzaldua, Godwin, and Volonino state the best 
practice is to unplug a computer or remove a laptop’s battery, so as to preserve the exact 
contents of a disk for later investigation without introducing changes to the system. Using 
the operating system shutdown alters log and temp file states; furthermore, a shutdown 
may trigger a logic bomb and a possible data wipe. [1] However, this approach has a 
problem; it does not preserve active system memory. A portion of the volatile memory 
can be found in the remnants of the operating system swap file, but this is not enough to 
reconstruct the state of the system. Thus, there is a push to find a way to collect a forensic 
image of memory without significantly altering the state of the system. 
From the Order of Volatility listed in RFC 3227, the first item of volatile data that 
should be collected during live-response is the contents of physical memory. [1] 
Although the specifics of collecting particular parts of volatile memory, such as network 
connections or running processes, have been known for some time, the issue of 
collecting, parsing, and analyzing the entire contents of physical memory is a relatively 
new endeavor. The most important questions when looking at memory are: why collect 
the contents of RAM, how is it useful, and what is missed when it is not analyzed?  
Some investigators collect the contents of RAM in hope of finding something not 
on the hard drive, such as strings or passwords, and malware analysts look to memory 
when dealing with malware because it is often encrypted or obfuscated in such a way that 
static analysis is extremely difficult. Finally, rootkits can hide processes, files, Registry 
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keys, and even network connections from the tools usually used to enumerate them, 
however, analyzing the contents of RAM can reveal these hidden items. The image may 
also contain information about processes that have since exited, but still reside in 
memory. When pages of memory are used by a process and the process terminates, these 
pages are marked as free, but the data is not overwritten until the pages need to be reused.  
As physical memory analysis grows, more investigators will pursue this as a 
viable source of valuable information. However, what is currently lacking is a tool which 
can merge the various sources that make up a virtual address space into a format that can 
be later analyzed in an efficient manner. [1] This report will investigate what data is 
stored and where it can be recovered from. In order to do this, it will examine the virtual 
memory system used by the Windows© XP Operating System so that a tool can be 
developed. 
C. OVERVIEW 
Inspired by the thesis by John S. Schultz at NPS titled “Offline Forensic Analysis 
of MICROSOFT® Windows® XP Physical Memory” [7], this thesis will expand upon the 
work done by Schultz to create an open source tool to analyze Windows© XP physical 
memory dumps for digital forensic evidence.  This section begins with a short overview 
of the current state of cyber crime and the motivation behind this report. Chapter II opens 
with the current state of computer forensics and the moves on to show how to collect the 
contents of physical memory and the page-file. In Section III, the Windows© Virtual 
Memory system is explained, showing how it is possible to recover information from a 
Windows© XP memory image. This includes an examination of virtual to physical 
address translation and the paging system, and how to navigate the virtual address space. 
Section IV introduces the important structures resident in memory, and how they can be 
analyzed to find useful information. Once the contents of memory are understood, the 
software used to automate the analysis of the image is covered in Chapter V.  Finally, a 
summary of the findings of this report and recommendations for further work are given in 
Section VI. 
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II. COMPUTER FORENSICS  
As attacks become more sophisticated, it is necessary to advance the latest tools 
and techniques used in forensic science to meet the increasing demands of investigators.  
In cyber crime investigations, the crime scene may consist of many computers perhaps 
spanning several networks.  A cyber criminal may affect a system locally or remotely. 
Where as a local attacker may leave physical evidence, a remote attack from the Internet 
can come from anywhere in the world and will leave only electronic evidence.  In either 
case, digital forensic evidence can be gathered from the criminal's computer, the victim's 
computer, or both.  This digital evidence can be broadly grouped into two categories, 
volatile and non-volatile. 
Non-volatile electronic evidence can be recovered after a system is powered off 
and is found on hard disks, USB flash drives, and removable media.  It is in non-volatile 
media where most of the electronic evidence originates.  System logs, malicious code, 
internet browser cache, e-mails, and deleted files are all forms of non-volatile evidence. 
Network logs may contain TCP session logs indicating the source IP address from where 
the attack originated.  The malicious code may be analyzed to determine what the 
attacker did to the system and analysis of the hard disk can also lead to the recovery of 
deleted files, which may contain evidence.  E-mail and browser history can show the 
criminal’s intent, expose any accomplices, and even give evidence as to how the attack 
occurred.   
However, a careful cyber criminal may permanently erase any incriminating 
evidence from non-volatile media, making its recovery impossible.  In the case of a 
compromised computer running malicious code, there is other evidence that can be 
useful; evidence in volatile memory.  Unlike data stored on hard drives, evidence found 
in main memory contains useful information about each running process, such as create 
times of various system objects, exit times, open files, executing code, and child process. 
However, it disappears once power is removed from the system. This type of evidence is 
useful if a malicious program is running on a live system, because unlike the files on the 
hard drive, this evidence cannot be erased from memory as long as malicious code is 
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running.  If the investigator can capture the state of the system as closely to the way it 
was when the incident occurred, then through careful analysis evidence can be taken from 
the system.  The ultimate goal is to be able to completely reconstruct the state of the 
system using the memory and hard disks.  If this can be accomplished then the crime 
scene can be reconstructed and analyzed in a controlled environment, making gathering 
evidence more reliable. 
A. CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS 
There are many places where digital evidence might be found within a computer 
system. One procedure for incident response is to immediately remove power from the 
system and take it to a computer forensics lab. [15] On the other hand, if the system is 
powered off before volatile storage such as physical memory is captured its content is 
lost. Once a computer system is in the lab, a write blocker is used to further prevent 
writing to the disks. Once that is in place, forensic copies of the system’s hard disks are 
made and future analysis is carried out using the copies rather than the original disks. [13] 
A forensic copy is an exact copy which does not alter the contents of the source disk. 
This is done so that the results of the investigation can be reproduced and verified by 
independent investigators. Write blockers may be implemented using software after the 
system has been booted; however the safest method is a hardware device installed 
between the hard disk and the mother board.  
A forensic investigation needs to be carried out fairly quickly because the 
evidence is usually needed for a court case, and if the evidence is not found in time it 
becomes useless.  As hard disk capacities increase, investigators need to focus their 
efforts in order to find useful evidence. Fortunately, the contents of physical memory 
may be able to provide investigators important evidence or insight as to where to find it 
on the disk; thus reducing the amount of time and manpower needed for an investigation. 
As physical memory analysis expands, more investigators will pursue this as a viable 
source of valuable information. Unfortunately, what is currently lacking are extensive 
tools which can merge the various sources that make up a virtual address space in to a 
format that can be later analyzed in an efficient manner. 
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B. DUMPING PHYSICAL MEMORY 
According to guidelines, digital evidence should be collected in order from the 
most volatile to the least. [13] This means that the one of the first things an investigator 
should do is copy the contents of RAM from all computers at the scene that are still 
running. The problem is that nothing should be done which might compromise the state 
of the suspect device. This reasoning is sound; however, this rule may be relaxed as long 
as the impact of the imaging technique is considered in the investigation. [16] There are 
several methods to acquire physical memory and this section provides an overview of the 
various options available as well as the technical aspects related to each. 
1. Hardware Devices 
In the last few years, there has been research into alternatives to software-based 
acquisition. These techniques have the advantage of gaining direct access to the memory 
via DMA that can copy the entire contents of RAM without modifying it. In addition, 
they can copy it very quickly while halting the processor, which eliminates the risk of 
data changing during the imaging process.  
In February 2004, Brian Carrier and Joe Grand published “A Hardware-Based 
Memory Acquisition Procedure for Digital Investigations,” in the Digital Investigation 
Journal. This paper proposed the idea of using a hardware expansion card named Tribble 
to acquire the contents of physical memory. [2] It dumps physical memory in a manner 
that does not introduce new software to the system and does not rely on the operating 
system. This allows an investigator to retrieve the contents of volatile memory without 
starting a new process or running potentially malicious code. The paper introduced a 
prototype which can be installed in a PCI slot and copies the contents of the RAM to 
external media. A hardware device such as the Tribble is unobtrusive and easily 
accessible. The major limitation with a device such as this is that if not installed prior to 
an incident it is ineffective for incident response. [2] Currently, the Tribble device is not 
commercially available; however, other hardware devices do exist, but they are only 
available to security professionals. 
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Research preformed by Maximillian Dornseif has shown that it is possible to 
access memory through the Firewire interface. At PacSec in November of 2005, he 
presented a paper, “Owned by an iPod” where he demonstrated how a firewire device can 
read/write active memory within a Mac, BSD or Linux machine. At Ruxcon 2006, Adam 
Boileau presented “Hit by a Bus: Physical Access Attacks with Firewire” where he 
enabled the targeting of a Windows© XP machine. Utilizing a Linux box with firewire 
support he revealed several hacks using live memory reading and writing against 
Windows© XP. However, firewire collection presents some problems. First, there may 
not be firewire ports available on the computer and second, plugging in a firewire device 
might require the operating system to activate the port, which may alter the state of the 
system and if not done properly, may crash the system. The primary issue is that the 
concepts and tools available for firewire memory imaging are still immature and need 
more research before they will become widely acceptable. Active memory and live data 
collection are still new to the field of digital forensics and have issues regarding 
reliability and analysis. As recently as BlackHat in February 2007 in DC, Joanna 
Rutkowska demonstrated how to defeat firewire based memory imaging utilizing a low 
level program, in the CPU. [6] Thus, the desire to collect a snapshot of the state of the 
system should not overshadow the value of preserving the integrity of the data collected. 
[6] 
2. Software Methods 
When using software acquisition the imaging program must first be loaded into 
memory, which alters the memories contents and possibly displaces data. Also, the 
program could rely on libraries that may have been subverted by the attacker. It is 
possible that the program could receive false data from corrupted system files since the 
software accesses physical memory through the operating system. Thus, with software 
alone, it is not possible to obtain a snapshot of physical memory completely unaffected 
by such tools.  However, an undisturbed snapshot is not always necessary for forensic 
analysis of memory because useful forensic evidence can be extracted from a physical 
memory image captured with a software tool. [3] Since there are no native tools on 
Windows© XP to dump the contents of system memory, a third-party program must be 
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used.  One such tool is George Garner’s variant of the GNU dd utility [3]. The dd 
program copies data in blocks from one file to another.  In the case of Garner’s version, 
the input file is \\.\PhysicalMemory, which represents the device name for physical 
memory in Windows©.  This, however, is no longer available on Vista, the newest 
version of Windows©. It is important to use the noerror option when reading from 
memory to ensure all readable blocks of data are copied because without this option, the 
dd program will stop after a read error. [3]  As for the output file, it is recommended that 
no output file is specified in favor of piping the output of dd to netcat with the command 
line.  The netcat[18] program can be used to send and receives data over a network 
connection, this allows physical memory to be copied and sent directly to an external 
computer connected to the network so the data is not saved to the local hard disk.  A 
newer variant of dd is now available called KnTDD from GMG Systems, Inc. and is part 
of KnTTools which provides advanced memory acquisition and analysis capabilities[19].  
3. Hibernation 
Hibernation is used to save the contents of volatile memory to disk in a file called 
the hiberfil.sys which allows the system to power down without permanently losing that 
data. Since the system uses this file to restore the state of the system, some useful 
information might be available in the hibernation file. It is also possible that that 
hibernation could be a useful way to acquire the contents of memory, since no additional 
programs would have to be loaded. Unfortunately though, there are several problems 
associated with using hibernation. First, when the system is hibernated it writes data to a 
file, hiberfil.sys and if this file exists it will be overwritten, therefore the old file should 
be copied from the system before the system is hibernated. Second, enabling hibernation 
on systems where it is disabled requires changing the state of the machine, which 
increases the risk of changing data. Microsoft Windows supports a "suspend to disk" 
mode. Nicolas Ruff and Matthieu Suiche developed a library, called Sandman, which 
allows reading and writing the hibernation file. They recently presented their results at 
PacSec 07 [20]. 
Hibernation could come in handy in a forensic investigation. You just have to 
send the computer to sleep in order to preserve the most important parts of its main 
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memory on disk. The presentation outlines the format of the hibernation file. It also 
briefly discusses the variations between different OS versions and mentions the 
compression algorithms involved. With the help of the Sandman library the hibernation 
file could be converted into a raw memory dump and possibly also into a crash dump 
(because the CPU state is preserved, too). Unfortunately the library is not available to the 
public yet. 
C. ACQUIRING THE PAGE-FILE 
Even more pages can be recovered if the examiner has access to the page-file for 
each system. Using the page-file might also allow the examiner to use more information 
in the memory image. In order to use the page-file effectively, however, it must be 
acquired at the same time as memory acquisition. By default, Windows© uses only one 
paging file, %SystemDrive%\pagefile.sys, but the true locations and filenames for paging 
files should be found using the registry. Capturing the page-file is difficult on a live 
system as traditional file copying utilities cannot open them. When the system is running 
the files are in use by the operating system and may not be opened by another process. It 
would be beneficial for first responders to have a program to capture both physical 
memory and the paging file in one step, but this will require further research. To acquire 
the page-file mount the drive in a guest operating system and copy the page-file. The 
examiner must be careful to use a write blocker so that no changes are made to the source 
drive. The delay between capturing a memory image and the paging file may create 
inconsistencies that could hinder analysis.  Power to the system should be secured 
immediately after obtaining the memory image in order to freeze the page-file in a state 
as close to the state it was in when the image was obtained. 
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III. WINDOWS VIRTUAL MEMORY 
The Windows© operating system creates a private virtual memory space for each 
running process using the memory manager.  The memory manager is used to map a 
process’ virtual address space to the system’s physical memory or RAM.  All modern 
operating systems use some form of Virtual Memory (VM) system to give each process a 
large address space while preventing it from gaining access to data belonging to other 
processes. [5] The basic concept behind virtual memory is relatively simple. For each 
process, the operating system maps virtual addresses to physical memory because RAM 
has less storage space and is more expensive than a hard disk. The memory manager 
creates data structures called page tables which the CPU uses to translate virtual 
addresses into physical addresses. Each virtual address is associated with a system-space 
structure called a page table entry (PTE), which contains the physical address to which 
the virtual address is mapped. [16] For example, Figure 3-1 shows how three consecutive 
virtual pages are mapped to three pages that are not physically contiguous.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Mapping Virtual Addresses to Physical Memory (x86) [From 5] 
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If the operating system runs out of space in physical RAM, some data is paged out 
to make room. The paged data is maintained on the system’s hard drive. [5]  If a page is 
not mapped into physical memory, the operating system marks the page as invalid. Any 
access to this page causes a page fault, which then causes the OS to copy the contents of 
the page from secondary storage into memory.  
To implement VM, Windows© maintains a large amount of data. It needs to know 
if data is in RAM or on the disk.  Maintaining this information for each byte of an 
address space would require more memory than the address space itself and for this 
reason Windows© breaks the address space into 4KB pages (or 4MB if large pages are 
enabled) and maintains this information in page tables. A page table entry (PTE) consists 
of the physical address of the page if the page is mapped to RAM and also some 
attributes of the page. [15] The VMM used by Windows© XP allows each process to 
access a full 4GB of virtual addresses, translating those virtual addresses into physical 
addresses. [5] Within each virtual address space, there is a portion dedicated as user space 
and a portion reserved for the operating system.  User space is for application code, 
global variables, the process stack, and dynamically linked libraries (DLLs) and it spans 
from virtual address 0x00000000 to 0x7FFFFFFF.  The system address space is 
accessible by all processes and is for use by the operating system. It ranges from 
0x80000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF and contains the necessary information for system 
management of the virtual memory, including the page directory and the page table 
entries (PTEs) used for virtual addresses translation. 
A. VIRTUAL ADDRESS TRANSLATION 
Windows© uses virtual addresses to abstract the memory storage system from the 
rest of the operating system and other programs. The operating system presents each 
program with a large private virtual address space and each time a program references a 
virtual address the operating system translates that virtual address into a physical address 
and retrieves the requested data. If the data is not in memory, it loads the data from the 
disk. During memory analysis, the examiner needs to use this same translation process, 
but without help from the operating system. Windows© on an x86 system uses a two-
level page table structure to translate virtual addresses to physical addresses. [5] A 32-bit 
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virtual address is interpreted as three separate components—the page directory index, the 
page table index, and the byte index—that are used as offsets into the structures that 
describe page how the page is mapped, as illustrated in Figure 3-2. The page size and the 
PTE width dictate the width of the page directory and page table index fields. For 
example, on x86 systems, the byte index requires 12 bits to describe the location of all 
4096 bytes in each page. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Translating a Valid Virtual Address (x86-specific) [From 5] 
The page directory index is used to locate the page table in which the PTE is 
located. The page table index is used to locate the PTE, which, contains the physical 
address to which a virtual page maps. The byte index indicates the proper address within 
that physical page. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship of these three values and how they 
are used to map a virtual address into a physical address. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Components of a 32-bit Virtual Address on x86 Systems [From 5] 
Address translation is generally a three stage procedure. Every process on a 
Windows system maintains a DirectoryTableBase variable. On an x86 systems this value 
is stored in the CR3 register when the process is running. This value contains the base 
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address of the table of Page Directory Entries (PDE) for that process. For each virtual 
address, a PDE is specified using a few bits from the original virtual address. The PDE is 
used to find the base address of a page of Page Table Entries (PTE). The PTE is 
designated using this base address and some more bits from the original virtual address. 
The PTE in turn points to the base address of the page in physical memory where the data 
is stored. The final address in physical memory is the base address of this page plus the 
remaining bits from the original virtual address. The least significant bit in a PDE or PTE 
entry is the Valid or V bit. When this bit is one the entry is said to be ‘valid’ and bits 12-
31 of the entry contain the Page Frame Number (PFN) used in the next part of the address 
translation. In a PDE, the PFN points to the page containing the PTE. In a PTE, the PFN 
points to the page containing the memory indicated in the original virtual address. On the 
other hand, when the V bit is zero the entry is said to be ‘invalid’ and a different set of 
rules must be used to find the data in question. 
1. Page Directories 
Each process has one page directory; a page the memory manager uses to map the 
location of all page tables for that process. The physical address of the process page 
directory is stored in the kernel process (KPROCESS) block, but it is also mapped 
virtually at address 0xC0300000 on x86 systems. The CPU knows the location of the 
page directory page because a special register (CR3 on x86 systems) that is loaded by the 
memory manager contains the physical address of the page directory. Each time a thread 
begins execution that is not part of the current process this register is loaded with the 
address of the new process’ page directory. Context switches between threads in the same 
process don't cause the address to be reloaded because all threads within the same process 
share the same address space. The page directory is composed of page directory entries 
(PDEs), each of which is 4 bytes long and describes the state and location of all the 
possible page tables for that process. On x86 systems, 1024 page tables are required to 
represent the full 4-GB virtual address space. The process page directory that maps these 
page tables contains 1024 PDEs. Therefore, the page directory index needs to be 10 bits 
wide. Because Windows© provides a private address space for each process, each process 
has its own set of page tables to map its private address space. [5]  However, the page 
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tables that map system space are shared among all processes. To avoid having multiple 
page tables describing the same virtual memory, when a process is created, the page 
directory entries that describe system space are initialized to point to the existing system 
page tables. 
2. Page Tables 
The process page directory entries point to individual page tables. Page tables are 
composed of an array of PTEs. The virtual address's page table index field (as shown in 
Figure 4) indicates which PTE within the page table maps the data page in question. On 
x86 systems, the page table index is 10 bits wide, allowing you to reference up to 1024 4-
byte PTEs. However, because 32-bit Windows© provides a 4-GB private virtual address 
space, more than one page table is needed to map the entire address space. To calculate 
the number of page tables required to map the entire 4-GB process virtual address space, 
divide 4 GB by the virtual memory mapped by a single page table. Recall that each page 
table on an x86 system maps 4 MB of data pages. Thus, 1024 page tables (4 GB/4 MB) 
are required to map the full 4-GB address space. Valid PTEs have two main fields: the 
page frame number (PFN) of the physical page containing the data or of the physical 
address of a page in memory, and some flags that describe the state and protection of the 
page, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Valid x86 Hardware PTEs [From 5] 
28
3. Individual Bytes 
Once the memory manager has found the physical page in question, it must find 
the requested data within that page and this is where the byte index field comes in. The 
byte index field tells the CPU which byte of data in the page you want to reference. On 
x86 systems, the byte index is 12 bits wide, allowing you to reference up to 4096 bytes of 
data (the size of a page). So, adding the byte offset to the physical page number retrieved 
from the PTE completes the translation of a virtual address to a physical address. 
B. THE PAGING SYSTEM  
Ideally, when a process reads from, or writes to, a location in its virtual address 
space, that address is available in physical memory for immediate use.  The working set 
is the set of virtual pages currently in main memory.  But a system is not capable of 
providing enough physical addresses in main memory to map to every address of each 
process’s virtual address space.  When a thread references a virtual page that is not in the 
working set, a page fault occurs.  The page fault triggers the memory manager to load the 
desired page into memory and update the working set to include the newly loaded virtual 
page. This is a valid page fault and is normally transparent to the user.  An invalid page 
fault is a request for data that is not accessible and will usually result in a system crash. 
If there is a need to free space in RAM, then parts of code and data that are not 
currently needed can be transferred to the hard disk in the page-file. This file is generally 
called pagefile.sys and is usually stored in the root directory of the primary drive; 
however one should check the system settings for its actual location. The format of the 
page-file is very simple, and can be treated the same as memory. It is simply a contiguous 
block of data which can be referenced by the same offsets as used for physical memory. 
Because of the constant swapping of pages, the total address space of virtual memory is 
rarely contained entirely within physical memory, nor is it ever constant.  
Only the parts of the program and data that are in active use need to be in physical 
memory. Thus, parsing and analyzing the contents of a RAM dump in isolation without 
the page-file will not provide a complete view of memory. This is because pages that 
have been swapped out to the page-file are not utilized in the memory analysis. To 
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overcome this Nicholas Maclean published his thesis work, Acquisition and Analysis of 
Windows Memory [13], in the spring of 2006. He explains the inner workings of the 
Windows© memory management system and provides an open-source tool written in 
Python called vtop to reconstruct the virtual address space of a process. Jesse Kornblum 
also released his work referred to as the “Buffalo” paper or by its full title, “Using Every 
Part of the Buffalo in Windows Memory Analysis” early in 2007 [8]. In this paper, Jesse 
demonstrates how more data can be recovered using invalid Page Table Entries. 
C. INVALID ENTRIES 
Just because an entry is invalid, doesn’t mean that the data it references is 
inaccessible. [8]  One can follow the same rules as the operating system to access the data 
in question; however, it is still possible that the data was never loaded into memory and 
thus is truly inaccessible. When a page is removed from memory it is marked as invalid. 
An invalid PTE or PDE will always have its least-significant bit set to zero, but there are 
a number of reasons for it being invalid each of which uses a slightly different format and 
each invalid PDE or PTE fits into one of six categories: Page-file, Demand Zero, 
Transition, Prototype, Zero, or Unknown. Below we describe each of these in detail.  
1. Page-File 
If both the P and T bits in an invalid PTE or PDE entry are zero, the entry points 
to a frame in one of the paging files. Windows© can support up to 16 paging files, so the 
page-file number, PageFileNumber, is given in bits 1-4. The offset of the desired frame in 
the page-file, PageFileOffset, is in bits 12-31 of the invalid entry. [8]  The true offset in 
the paging file is the value of bits 12-31 from the entry plus some bits from the original 
virtual address. Note that both PDEs and PTEs can point into the Page-file. For a PDE 
Page-file entry, PageFileOffset uses bits 12-21, shifted right 12 places, from the original 
virtual address being referenced. For a Page-file PTE entry, PageFileOffset uses bits 0-11 
from the original virtual address. 
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2. Demand Zero 
Like a page-file entry, Demand Zero entries have zeros in the T and P bits. But 
when the PageFileNumber and PageFileOffset are both zero, the operating system has 
marked the requested page as Demand Zero and would return any request for it with a 
page of zeros. 
3. Transition 
When the T bit in an entry is one and the P bit is zero, the page is said to be in 
Transition. [8] This means that the page has been modified but not yet written back to the 
disk. Even though a page was in transition, the page was still in active memory and can 
therefore be retrieved by an examiner. Just like a valid entry, the page frame number is 
given in bits 12-31 and can be used to continue the address translation process.  
4. Prototype 
In a PTE, when the P bit is one, the entry is a pointer to a prototype page table 
entry. Note that when P is one, the value of the T bit is part of the prototype’s index. The 
entry contains an index number that can be used to compute the virtual address of the 
prototype PTE. Prototype PTEs are used when more than one process is using the same 
page in memory. [8] Prototypes are created when the operating system needs to invalidate 
the page in question. This is to avoid having to update all of the processes using the page 
each time the page is moved. Instead, they direct each process using the page to point to 
the same prototype. The prototype then points to the page’s true location.  When a page 
in question is moved, the memory manager only has to update the one prototype. The 
PTE stored by each process acts like a shortcut or symbolic link to the true PTE. Each 
Prototype PTE should be in one of the six states listed below.  
• Active: The V bit is one. The page was in memory and can be accessed using the 
Page Frame Number in the prototype PTE entry. 
• Transition: The V bit is zero and the T bit is one. The page was in Transition, but 
can be accessed in the memory image using the Page Frame Number in the 
prototype PTE entry. 
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• Modified No-Write: Like a transition prototype PTE, but the Dirty bit, bit six, is 
also one. The page can be accessed in the memory image using the Page Frame 
Number in the prototype PTE entry. 
• Page File: The V, T, and P bits are all zero. The data are stored in the page file. 
• Demand Zero: The V, T, and P bits are zero along with the PageFileNumber and 
PageFileOffset. The page should be satisfied with all zeros. 
• Mapped File: The P bit is one. The operating system would retrieve the requested 
data from the original file on the disk. The author does not know how to use the 
value from these prototype PTEs. [8] 
5. Zero 
If the entry is zero, there is no information available for the page in question. 
Specifically, the page has been committed, but has not yet been accessed. That is, the 
operating system has allocated the page but has not read from or written to it. In this 
situation, the page does not contain any information relating to the process of which it 
belongs. However, it may still contain residual information from a process that has 
released the page for reuse by another process.  Some processes will zero out a page that 
is allocated or fill it with random data; but this is not always the case.  If these pages do 
contain data from another process the investigator will not be able to tell where the data 
came from without more information which can be obtained through a more in-depth 
analysis of the memory image. 
6. Unknown 
It is still possible that the status of the address is unknown and in this case the 
entries are put in this category and disregarded. [8] 
Until recently, the only investigation performed on physical memory was similar 
to the analysis performed by system administrators on crash dumps to find out the cause 
for a crash. Theoretically, the contents of physical memory can show everything about 
the state of the system at the time the memory dump was taken (open files, running 
processes, network connections, logged on users). However, the analysis of the complete 
image of physical memory and page-file is able to reveal much more information. [8] 
When a process terminates, the pages of memory which were allocated to it are marked 
as free by the memory management system, but the actual contents of these pages are not 
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overwritten until the memory is used. This means that this portion of memory actually 
contains data which is logically no longer part of the system. [9] This data may prove 
invaluable to a forensic investigation as it will be totally invisible to conventional crash 
dump analysis and the only way to recover it, is by means of an in depth forensic analysis 
of physical memory. [9] 
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IV. PROCESS BASICS 
Windows stores information about each process in an EPROCESS kernel 
structure. The EPROCESS structures for all processes are stored in the address space of 
the System process. Once the base address of the EPROCESS block is known, values can 
be read by adding that offset and reading the value. Of the 4GB virtual address space 
allocated to the process, only the 1st 2GB of the virtual address space are available for 
the process to write to, with the 2nd 2GB used as shared system memory (although this 
can be changed to 3GB for the process and 1GB for the system using a boot option) [5]. 
This means that by looking up all virtual addresses ranging from 0x00000000 to 
0x80000000 (0-2GB) all memory writable by that process can be produced. 
A. EPROCESS STRUCTURE 
The executive process (EPROCESS) block is the most important structure in 
memory for forensic analysis because it is the starting point of any further investigation 
of that process. All EPROCESS blocks are part of a doubly linked list, which includes 
blocks for active processes, although it is not uncommon to encounter exited processes in 
the list.  This happens when an exited process is still opened as a handle by another active 
process; an exited EPROCESS block is deleted only when the last handle to the process 
is closed. 
Each process on a Windows system is represented as an executive process, or 
EPROCESS, block. This EPROCESS block is a data structure in which various attributes 
of the process, as well as pointers to a number of other attributes and data structures 
relating to the process, are maintained. Because the data structure is a sequence of bytes, 
each sequence with a specific meaning and purpose, these structures can be read and 






B. EXECUTIVE THREAD 
Threads are entities within a process that represent executable code of the process.  
Every process starts with a single thread, which may spawn other threads.  Multiple  
threads allow a process to do several tasks in parallel, with each thread doing a separate 
task.  This is also more efficient because when the Operating System switches threads in 
the same process it does not cause a VM context switch. 
Windows represents a thread by the executive thread (ETHREAD).  Threads are 
important to forensic analysis because threads are scheduled for execution not processes.  
A thread’s creation and exit times are stored in its ETHREAD block.  The initial 
execution address for a thread is also stored in the ETHREAD block. 
C. SEARCHING FOR PROCESSES 
Now the problem is to find a pattern which reliably identifies the objects. This 
section describes the data structures representing processes and threads. It notes constant 
values and formulates rules which build upon pairs of offsets and values. [14]  Other 
rules will be derived from functional requirements of the operating system. 
Below we describe an algorithm for a scanner that will identify process and thread 
objects. [14]  The scanner advances through the whole dump file at a step width equal to 
the kernel’s memory allocation granularity. At every position the scanner looks for a 
valid process and thread structure by reading in the data and parsing it. This object is then 
evaluated based on a rule set. 
1. Constraints 
Values used to find valid process structures: [14] 
Pcb.Header.Type != 0x03 
Pcb.Header.Size != 0x1b 
Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] == 0 
Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] % 0x1000) != 0 
Pcb.ThreadListHead.Flink < KERNEL_OFFSET 
Pcb.ThreadListHead.Blink < KERNEL_OFFSET 
   WorkingSetLock.Event.Type != 0x01 
WorkingSetLock.Event.Size != 0x04 
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V. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
A. IMPLEMENTATION 
The scanner was implemented in C using Notepad as the text editor and gcc as the 
compiler.  It has been tested in cygwintm [21] running on Windows© XP SP2.  The system 
we developed and tested with is an Intel P-III 1.1 Ghz laptop with 512 MB of RAM.  We 
needed no flags or modules other than those listed in the header file in Appendix A.  
Simply compile using a standard gcc command with the header located in the same 
directory as the source file. 
B. USAGE 
Below we provide a reprint of the “usage” string printed by the scanner we 
implanted.  
Usage statement:  ./eproc.exe option <imageFile> 
-l Walk active process list: ./eproc.exe -l <imageFile> <pAddress> 
-s Scan image for process structures:  ./eproc.exe -s <imageFile> 
-t Translates Virtual Address: ./eproc.exe -t <imageFile> <pAddress> 
<vAddress> 
-d Dump process information:  ./eproc.exe -d <imageFile> <pAddress> 
-i Identify Operating System:  ./eproc.exe -i <imageFile> -verbose 
-p Gets the number of pages in memory : ./eproc.exe -p <imageFile> 
<pAddress> 
-m Dump Process Memory:  ./eproc.exe -l <imageFile> <pAddress> 
<pageFile> 
C. FEATURES 
1. Walk Active Process List 
In conducting an investigation, after the preliminary data collection is complete 
the investigator will start the off-line analysis.  Using this tool the first thing that the 
investigator should do is to get a process listing using the active process list.  The 
command line to do this would look like: ./eproc.exe -l <imageFile>    It will 
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search for the System process, which is the active process head, starting at the beginning 
of the file, using the same mechanism that is used to scan the image for process structures 
and will traverse the list once it is found.  Starting at the active process list head, System 
process on Windows, the tool follows the forward links (Flinks) and backward links 
(Blinks).  They are pointers to the process before or after the current process in the active 
process list.  Optionally if the physical address of the System process is known it can be 
entered at the command line after the path to the image file and the program will begin its 
search at that address. The closer you get the less time it will take to find the system 
process.   
One weakness with this method is that it will not find processes that have been 
removed from the active process list by DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation) 
[17].  Such processes can be hidden because a device driver or loadable kernel module 
has access to kernel memory and can modify objects in the kernel memory space in a 
reliable fashion in order to hide objects such as processes.  In order to hide a process 
using object manipulation you must first locate the EPROCESS block of  the process that 
you want to hide, then change the process behind it in the list to point to the process after 
the process you are trying to hid.  Finally, change the process after it to point to the 
process before the one you are trying to hide. [17] Now, the active process list points 
around the hidden process and it is not reported when the system returns the active 
process list.   
The process continues to run because scheduling in Windows© is thread based and 
not process based. [17] So while the process is not reported by the Operating System, it 
continues to schedule the processes threads for execution without adverse affect to the 
system. [17]   However, even though this function may not list all of the processes that 
could be running on the system it is a good initial listing and will show processes that 
have not been unlinked and still may look suspicious, but are not sophisticated enough to 
remove themselves from the process list.  It also creates a baseline to compare the results 
from a full memory scan.  Any discrepancies between the listing and the scan indicate 
areas that could use further investigation. 
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2. Scan Image for Process Structures 
Once the investigator has a listing of the active processes the next step is to scan 
the image for process structures.  This is the mechanism that is used to find the active 
process head when walking the list; however the list function stops scanning once the 
System process is found and uses the linked list to find processes.  The following 
command will allow the investigator to scan a memory image: ./eproc.exe -s 
<imageFile>  The scan may take several minutes to complete depending on the system 
on the size of the memory image.  The results of the scan provide the investigator with a 
list of every block of data that fits the process structure using expected values in specific 
locations.  The algorithm scans the memory image at an 8-byte interval because processes 
are 8-byte aligned and compares each chunk of data to a process structure.  If values in 
specific fields match then a valid process is found.   
The advantage to this is that it will find all process structures that are in the 
memory image regardless of whether they have been removed through DKOM or have 
been recently exited as long as the structure is still in memory and still meets the criteria 
that describe a valid process structure.  The disadvantage to this method of gaining 
process information is that it is slow and on large images will take significantly longer 
than walking the list if you need quick results.  Comparing the results of both a listing 
and scan will provide the best results for investigators and give them a reference point to 
direct further investigation. 
3. Information Provided from Process Lists 
The useful information provided from the list and scan functions are the image 
name and size which are provided in order to provide descriptive information to the 
investigator for future reference: 
• Each process name, which can sometimes provide the investigator an idea 
as to the function of the process and whether it is a process that is suspect 
or not,  
• Pid and PPid give information as to which process spawned the current 
process which is useful in determining where the processes originated,  
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• Time created can be used to determine a timeline of events in an 
investigation,  
• Offset in image is important for further investigation because this is 
necessary input for the functions that work on specific processes,  
• Page directory base address this is also useful information for manual 
analysis and is used by the tool for address translation.   
The information provided in the listing provides broad overview of what was 
running on the system and can give clues as to where to investigate further. 
4. Translates Virtual to Physical Address 
Another feature is the ability of the program to translate a virtual address to a 
physical offset in to the memory image.  A command that will achieve this is: 
./eproc.exe -t <imageFile> <pAddress> <vAddress>  The examiner may want to 
use this feature to aid in any manual analysis of the memory image.  The procedure for 
this is to enter the flag then the address to the process of which the address is taken then 
the address to be translated.  As of now it does not work for addresses that have been 
paged. 
5. Dump Process Information 
Now that the investigator has an idea of which processes need further 
investigation, the next step is to get the process image data from memory.  This function 
takes the offset to a process structure as its argument and overlays a process structure to 
the data.  An example command is: ./eproc.exe -d <imageFile> <pAddress>  If the 
data found at the address provided fits the valid process format it prints information about 
the process including its DOS Header, File Header, Optional Header, and Section data.  
The information provided by this function is most useful when combined with a manual 
analysis on the image.  One feature under development is the ability to carve out the data 
referenced in the headers and specific sections for further analysis.  If there is not a valid 
process structure found at the offset given, the program prints: “no valid process found”.   
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6. Identify Operating System 
Normally the investigator will already know the Operating System the image was 
taken from, but it may be useful to identify the Operating System for verification.  A 
command to identify the Operating System of an image is: ./eproc.exe -i 
<imageFile> -verbose Also, the verbose option returns information about the Kernel 
image that may prove to be useful in the investigation.  This function will print out the 
version of windows that the image was captured from.  It does this by locating the Kernel 
Base Address and comparing it to addresses known to be used by common Operating 
Systems [14].   
7. Gets the Number of Pages in Memory 
Statistics relating to the number of valid and invalid pages referenced in the page 
directory is useful in determining memory usage and if a process was exhibiting suspect 
behavior.  The command to get the memory usage of a process is: ./eproc.exe -p 
<imageFile> <pAddress> to get these statistics the scanner simply counts the number 
of valid and invalid addresses are in the page table for the specified process.  Once a valid 
process is found, the page directory can be found using the process structures provided in 
appendix A.  With the location of the page directory the rest of the virtual to physical 
translation information is found using the proper translation method. 
8. Dump Process Memory 
Now that the investigator has found the process that is suspect the next step is to 
retrieve its memory space from the memory image and the page file.  To do this the 
command would be: ./eproc.exe -l <imageFile> <pAddress> <pageFile> this 
function takes the image file and optionally a page-file and dumps the processes memory 
space to a file in its own folder.  The file and folder will be named with the process name 
and the PID (process id).  In order to reduce the amount of space required it does not 
dump global pages from the system shared memory space.  The algorithm used to find 
the data and output it to a file goes through all of the virtual addresses in the page tables 
and translates them using ether the valid address translation method or the invalid address 
translation method.  For invalid addresses if the address flags indicate it is in the page-file 
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it retrieves the page from the page-file if it is provided.  The output function simply 
writes the pages to the output file in the order they appear in the page tables.  This puts 
the pages in ascending order based on the virtual address of the page.  A second file is 
produced that contains the virtual addresses listed in the same order as the dump file so 
that they can be later matched to the corresponding page from memory.  A useful 
function would be a mechanism to search the dumped file and would be useful and aid 
the investigator in advanced analysis.  This would make it easier to reconstruct memory 
space and look at specific parts that may need further investigation.  One feature that is 
being explored is the ability to find and dump specific parts of the process image, such as 
specific DLLs or all or part of the process executable. 
D. TESTING 
This program was tested using memory captured dd.exe. The system was a 
Laptop running Windows XP Service Pack 2 with 512 MB of RAM. The page-file was 
obtained by shutting down the system by removing the batteries and booting the system 
with Backtrack [22] to allow access and to ensure the integrity of the file.  The results of 
the test runs can be found in Appendix C. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
This report has shown that during the forensic process, as much attention must be 
paid to volatile memory as to the more traditional sources of evidence. It should no 
longer be standard practice for the contents of memory to be destroyed in the interest of 
the integrity of the data on the hard disks. Different techniques are either available now or 
will be available in the near future for acquiring memory images. Once a memory image 
has been taken it is possible to locate pages that would not normally be available to the 
investigator by incorporating information in the process’s page directories.  Currently this 
tool retrieves the pages in the order they appear in the page directories, it would be better 
to sort them in order of virtual address, however this is still in progress.  Another feature 
under development is the ability to analyze the data it produces.  There are few tools 
currently available which can analyze this data, however, it can be done manually and 
automated tools are under development. The release of the Volatility framework will 
hopefully allow developers to add to this toolbox easily. It is expected that in the near 
future, full suites of memory analysis software will be available, and the investigation of 
memory will be viewed with the same importance as any other areas of computer 
forensics. 
A. FUTURE WORK 
This paper has attempted to expand the amount of information available to an 
examiner conducting Windows© memory analysis. The current implementation of this 
tool extracts process data in its entirety and saves it in one consolidated file.  One area 
that needs to be addressed is the ability to extract specific parts of a process such as only 
the executable or specific DLLs.  This would facilitate an investigator’s search and allow 
more time for analysis.  Another area that needs further development is the robustness of 
options available that will allow the user to more easily conduct data retrieval and 
analysis. Although demonstrating that more information is available when using robust 
address translation, there are still many opportunities to increase the amount of 
recoverable data in a memory image. This will hopefully allow for more advanced  
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programs to be produced which could, for example analyze data structures and variables 
within process space and produce visualization systems for displaying the contents of 
memory in readable ways. 
There is also much more information available to the investigator by looking for 
other types of data structures.  Future developments will be able to find loaded DLLs, 
open file handles and which thread is accessing the files, encryption keys, and open 
sockets just to name a few.  All of this information will be useful to the investigator in 
recreating the scene of the digital crime.  Knowing if there were open sockets, threads 
executing, and which files were being accessed at the time of the incident give the 
investigator invaluable information as to the type, method, and extent of damage that may 
have occurred.  All of this information is available to some extent, but to take full 
advantage of the information it provides it needs to be organized and analyzed in 
meaningful ways. 
Hibernation may prove to be a useful method of acquiring memory, but more 
research needs to be done to make this a reliable tool in the forensic investigator’s tool 
box.  The ways in which Windows fetches, compresses, and stores memory are not fully 
understood, and it is not clear if any other operations are performed during the 
hibernation process.  Researchers have had some success in reverse engineering the 
proprietary algorithm used to hibernate systems running Windows©, however there is not 
enough evidence to show that the methods they use yield the results required by forensic 
analysis.  Furthermore, this method requires that hibernation be enabled prior to the 
incident which limits it usefulness to certain cases.  Another consideration is that 
hibernation a process operated by the system that is in question and it may be 
compromised possible yielding unreliable results.  If the system has been compromised 
nothing running on the system can be trusted. 
Firewire has been designed to access memory through DMA, which should lend it 
towards memory acquisition with minimal impact on the target system. Research has 
shown that this is possible on Windows© XP systems, but has yet to produce a viable 
solution which would be suitable for incident response.  While in some cases this may be 
an acceptable method, the investigator must introduce new hardware to the system thus 
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changing its state.  Whenever the investigator changes the state of the system by 
introducing new hardware, one cannot rule out the possibility that it will be recognized 
alerting the intruder and allowing for the destruction of evidence. 
A multitude of applications relating to and stemming from this research can be 
found in incident response, data recovery, computer forensics, and cyber crime 
investigation.  These are all interrelated, but each one is its own independent research 
area with unique difficulties and opportunities.  The field of memory analysis can be used 
to determine what was happening on a system at the time the memory image was taken, 
to find encryption keys and possibly reconstruct deleted files.  The ultimate result of 
research is to completely reconstruct the state of a live system from a memory image and 
hard disk.  The ability to do this is like being able to freeze a crime scene and completely 
reconstruct it in a controlled environment, possibly even while the criminal is still 
present. Further research will lead to greater understanding of computer systems leading 
to tools that will aid solving cyber crimes and convicting suspects.  
The final area of future research and possibly the most important when it comes to 
catching and convicting criminals is the admissibility of evidence obtained in the Court 
of Law.  Once the investigator has used the information to solve the crime it must then be 
used in court to convict the suspect.  As of now, the tool is simply an evidence 
acquisition tool used to diagnose symptoms of a system that appears to be compromised 
and only a small piece of the overall investigation.  However, in the future there will have 
to be some way to prove that the dump came from the system in question, that it has not 
been compromised, and be able to provide conclusive evidence that a crime was 
committed and that the suspect did indeed commit the crime in question.  Not only must 
the tools used by an investigator do this, but it must do it in proven, repeatable ways. 
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APPENDIX A. WINDOWS STRUCTURES 
A. WIN32STRUCTS.H  
/********************************************************************** 
Name Windows Physical Memory Offline Analyzer [7] 
File win32structs.h 
Version 1.0 
Author John Schultz 
 
Description Console Program which enumerates the processes running on a  
             Windows PC. The program reads an offline copy of the  
             physical memory for all the information gathered about the 











/*Each struct is defined based on that given by the Windows(R) Kernel 
Debugger with few exceptions, which are noted*/ 
struct _unnamed { 
    /* +0x000 */ long double var01; 
    /* +0x00a */ long double var02; 
    /* +0x014 */ long double var03; 
    /* +0x01e */ long double var04; 
}; 
 
struct LIST_ENTRY { 
    /* +0x000 */ void *Flink; 
    /* +0x004 */ void *Blink; 
}; 
 
struct UNICODE_STRING { 
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned short  Length; 
    /* 0x002 */ unsigned short  MaximumLength; 
    /* 0x004 */ unsigned short *Buffer; 
}; 
 
struct STRING { 
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned short Length; 
    /* 0x002 */ unsigned short MaximumLength; 
    /* 0x004 */ char          *Buffer; 
}; 
 
struct DISPATCHER_HEADER { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned char     Type; 
    /* +0x001 */ unsigned char     Absolute; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char     Size; 
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    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char     Inserted; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long     SignalState; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct LIST_ENTRY WaitList; 
}; 
 
struct KEVENT { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header; 
}; 
 
struct KDEVICE_QUEUE { 
    /* +0x000 */ short              Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ short              Size; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY  DeviceListHead; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long      Lock; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned char      Busy; 
}; 
 
struct KDPC { 
    /* +0x000 */ short             Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char     Number; 
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char     Importance; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY DpcListEntry; 
    /* +0x00c */ void             *DeferredRoutine; 
    /* +0x010 */ void             *DeferredContext; 
    /* +0x014 */ void             *SystemArgument1; 
    /* +0x018 */ void             *SystemArgument2; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long    *Lock; 
}; 
 
struct MMWSLE_HASH { 
  /* +0x000 */ void         *Key; 
  /* +0x004 */ unsigned long Index; 
}; 
 
struct MMSUPPORT_FLAGS { 
  /* +0x000 */ int Sessionspace : 1; 
  /* +0x000 */ int BeingTrimmed : 1; 
  /* +0x000 */ int SessionLoader : 1; 
  /* +0x000 */ int TrimHard : 1; 
  /* +0x000 */ int WorkingSetHard : 1; 
  /* +0x000 */ int AddressSpaceBeingDeleted : 1; 
  /* +0x000 */ int Available : 10; 
  /* +0x000 */ int AllowWorkingSetAdjustment : 8; 
  /* +0x000 */ int MemoryPriority : 8; 
}; 
 
struct MMWSL { 
  /* +0x000 */ unsigned long       Quota; 
  /* +0x004 */ unsigned long       FirstFree; 
  /* +0x008 */ unsigned long       FirstDynamic; 
  /* +0x00c */ unsigned long       LastEntry; 
  /* +0x010 */ unsigned long       NextSlot; 
  /* +0x014 */ void               *Wsle; /*points to MMWSLE*/ 
  /* +0x018 */ unsigned long       LastInitializedWsle; 
  /* +0x01c */ unsigned long       NonDirectCount; 
  /* +0x020 */ struct MMWSLE_HASH *HashTable; 
  /* +0x024 */ unsigned long       HashTableSize; 
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  /* +0x028 */ unsigned long       NumberOfCommittedPageTables; 
  /* +0x02c */ void               *HashTableStart; 
  /* +0x030 */ void               *HighestPermittedHashAddress; 
  /* +0x034 */ unsigned long       NumberOfImageWaiters; 
  /* +0x038 */ unsigned long       VadBitMapHint; 
  /* +0x03c */ unsigned short      UsedPageTableEntries[768]; 
  /* +0x63c */ unsigned long       CommittedPageTables[24]; 
}; 
 
struct MMSUPPORT { 
  /* +0x000 */ long long              LastTrimTime; 
  /* +0x008 */ struct MMSUPPORT_FLAGS Flags; 
  /* +0x00c */ unsigned long          PageFaultCount; 
  /* +0x010 */ unsigned long          PeakWorkingSetSize; 
  /* +0x014 */ unsigned long          WorkingSetSize; 
  /* +0x018 */ unsigned long          MinimumWorkingSetSize; 
  /* +0x01c */ unsigned long          MaximumWorkingSetSize; 
  /* +0x020 */ struct MMWSL          *VmWorkingSetList; 
  /* +0x024 */ struct LIST_ENTRY      WorkingSetExpansionLinks; 
  /* +0x02c */ unsigned long          Claim; 
  /* +0x030 */ unsigned long          NextEstimationSlot; 
  /* +0x034 */ unsigned long          NextAgingSlot; 
  /* +0x038 */ unsigned long          EstimatedAvailable; 
  /* +0x03c */ unsigned long          GrowthSinceLastEstimate; 
}; 
 
struct FAST_MUTEX { 
    /* +0x000 */ long                     Count; 
    /* +0x004 */ void                    *Owner; 
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long            Contention; 
    /* +0x00c */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Event; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long            OldIrql; 
}; 
 
struct CURDIR { 
    /* 0x000 */ struct UNICODE_STRING DosPath; 
    /* 0x008 */ void                 *Handle; 
}; 
 
struct PEB_LDR_DATA { 
    /* 0x000 */ unsigned long     Length; 
    /* 0x004 */ unsigned char     Initialized; 
    /* 0x008 */ void             *SsHandle; 
    /* 0x00c */ struct LIST_ENTRY InLoadOrderModuleList; 
    /* 0x014 */ struct LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderModuleList; 
    /* 0x01c */ struct LIST_ENTRY InInitializationOrderModuleList; 
    /* 0x024 */ void             *EntryInProgress; 
}; 
 
struct KSEMAPHORE { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header; 
    /* +0x010 */ long   Limit; 
}; 
 
struct KGDTENTRY { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short    LimitLow; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short    BaseLow; 
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    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long     HighWord; 
}; 
 
struct KIDTENTRY { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short    Offset; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short    Selector; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned short    Access; 
    /* +0x006 */ unsigned short    ExtendedOffset; 
}; 
 
struct HANDLE_TABLE { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long     TableCode; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct EPROCESS  *QuotaProcess; 
    /* +0x008 */ void             *UniqueProcessID; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long     HandleTableLock[4]; 
    /* +0x01c */ struct LIST_ENTRY HandleTableList; 
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long     HandleContentionEvent; 
    /* +0x030 */ void             *DebugInfo; 
    /* +0x034 */ long              ExtraInfoPages; 
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long     FirstFree; 
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long     LastFree; 
    /* +0x040 */ unsigned long     NextHandleNeedingPool; 
    /* +0x044 */ long              HandleCount; 
    /* +0x048 */ unsigned long     Flags; 
}; 
 
struct OWNER_ENTRY { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long OwnerThread; 
    /* +0x004    long          OwnerCount; */ 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long TableSize; 
}; 
 
struct OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short  Length; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char   UseDefaultObject; 
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char   CaseInsensitive; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long   InvalidAttributes; 
    /* +0x008 */ void           *GenericMapping; 
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long   ValidAccessMask; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned char   SecurityRequired; 
    /* +0x01d */ unsigned char   MaintainHandleCount; 
    /* +0x01e */ unsigned char   MaintainTypeList; 
    /* +0x020 */ void           *PoolType; 
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned long   DefaultPagedPoolCharge; 
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long   DefaultNonPagedPoolCharge; 
    /* +0x02c */ void           *DumpProcedure; 
    /* +0x030 */ void           *OpenProcedure; 
    /* +0x034 */ void           *CloseProcedure; 
    /* +0x038 */ void           *DeleteProcedure; 
    /* +0x03c */ void           *ParseProcedure; 
    /* +0x040 */ void           *SecurityProcedure; 
    /* +0x044 */ void           *QueryNameProcedure; 
    /* +0x048 */ void           *OkayToCloseProcedure; 
}; 
 
struct ERESOURCE { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY         SystemResourcesList; 
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    /* +0x008 */ struct OWNER_ENTRY       *OwnerTable; 
    /* +0x00c */ short                     ActiveCount; 
    /* +0x00e */ unsigned short            Flag; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct KSEMAPHORE        *SharedWaiters; 
    /* +0x014 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER *ExclusiveWaiters; 
    /* +0x018 */ struct OWNER_ENTRY        OwnerThreads[2]; 
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long             ContentionCount; 
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned short            NumberOfSharedWaiters; 
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned short            NumberOfExclusiveWaiters; 
    /* +0x030    void                     *Address;*/ 
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned long             CreatorBackTraceIndex; 
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long             SpinLock; 
}; 
 
struct SEGMENT { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct CONTROL_AREA *ControlArea; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long        TotalNumberOfPtes; 
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long        NonExtendedPtes; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long        WritableUserReferences; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long long   SizeOfSegment; 
    /* +0x018 */ long                 SegmentPteTemplate; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long        NumberOfCommittedPages; 
    /* +0x020 */ /* struct MMEXTEND_INFO */void *ExtendInfo; 
    /* +0x024 */ void                *SystemImageBase; 
    /* +0x028 */ void                *BasedAddress; 
    /* +0x02c */ long                 u1; 
    /* +0x030 */ long                 u2; 
    /* +0x034 */ long                *PrototypePte; 
    /* +0x038 */ long                 ThePtes[1]; 
}; 
 
struct CONTROL_AREA { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct SEGMENT       *Segment; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct LIST_ENTRY     DereferenceList; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long         NumberOfSectionReferences; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long         NumberOfPfnReferences; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long         NumberOfMappedViews; 
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned short        NumberOfSubsections; 
    /* +0x01a */ unsigned short        FlushInProgressCount; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long         NumberOfUserReferences; 
    /* +0x020 */ long                  unnamed; 
    /* +0x024 */ struct FILE_OBJECT   *FilePointer; 
    /* +0x028 */ /*struct EVENT_COUNTER*/void *WaitingForDeletion; 
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned short        ModifiedWriteCount; 
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned short        NumberOfSystemCacheViews; 
}; 
 
struct SUBSECTION { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct CONTROL_AREA  *ControlArea; 
    /* +0x004 */ long                  unnamed; 
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long         StartingSector; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long         NumberOfFullSectors; 
    /* +0x010 */ /*struct MMPTE*/void         *SubsectionBase; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long         UnusedPtes; 
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long         PtesInSubsection; 




struct SEGMENT_OBJECT { 
    /* +0x000 */ void                     *BaseAddress; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long             TotalNumberOfPtes; 
    /* +0x008 */ long long                 SizeOfSegment; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long             NonExtendedPtes; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long             ImageCommitment; 
    /* +0x018 */ struct CONTROL_AREA      *ControlArea; 
    /* +0x01c */ struct SUBSECTION        *Subsection; 
    /* +0x020 */ /*struct LARGE_CONTROL_AREA*/void *LargeControlArea; 
    /* +0x024 */ /*struct MMSECTION_FLAGS*/ void     *MmSectionFlags; 




struct SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS { 
    /* +0x000 */   void                  *DataSectionObject; 
    /* +0x004 */   void                  *SharedCacheMap; 
    /* +0x008 */   void                  *ImageSectionObject; 
}; 
 
struct SECTION_OBJECT { 
    /* +0x000 */   void                  *StartingVa; 
    /* +0x004 */   void                  *EndingVa; 
    /* +0x008 */   void                  *Parent; 
    /* +0x00c */   void                  *LeftChild; 
    /* +0x010 */   void                  *RightChild; 
    /* +0x014 */   struct SEGMENT_OBJECT *Segment; 
}; 
 
struct OBJECT_TYPE { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct ERESOURCE                  Mutex; 
    /* +0x038 */ struct LIST_ENTRY                 TypeList; 
    /* +0x040 */ struct UNICODE_STRING             Name;  
    /* +0x048 */ void                             *DefaultObject; 
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long                     Index; 
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned long                    TotalNumberOfObjects; 
    /* +0x054 */ unsigned long                    TotalNumberOfHandles; 
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long                HighWaterNumberOfObjects; 
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long                HighWaterNumberOfHandles; 
    /* +0x060 */ struct OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER    TypeInfo; 
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned long                     Key; 
    /* +0x0b0 */ struct ERESOURCE                  ObjectLocks[4]; 
}; 
 
struct OBJECT_HEADER { 
    /* +0x000 */ long                     PointerCount; 
    /* +0x004    long                     HandleCount; */ 
    /* +0x004 */ void                    *NextToFree; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct OBJECT_TYPE      *Type; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned char            NameInfoOffset; 
    /* +0x00d */ unsigned char            HandleInfoOffset; 
    /* +0x00e */ unsigned char            QuotaInfoOffset; 
    /* +0x00f */ unsigned char            Flags; 
    /* +0x010 */ /* struct OBJECT_CREATE_INFORMATION *ObjectCreateInfo; 
*/ 
    /* +0x010 */ void                    *QuotaBlockCharged; 
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    /* +0x014 */ void                    *SecurityDescriptor; 
}; 
 
struct VPB { 
    /* +0x000 */ short                        Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ short                        Size; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned short               Flags; 
    /* +0x006 */ unsigned short               VolumeLabelLength; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT        *DeviceObject; 
    /* +0x00c */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT        *RealDevice; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long                SerialNumber; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long                ReferenceCount; 




struct DEVICE_OBJECT { 
    /* +0x000 */ short                    Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short           Size; 
    /* +0x004 */ long                     ReferenceCount; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct DRIVER_OBJECT    *DriverObject; 
    /* +0x00c */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT    *NextDevice; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT    *AttachedDevice; 
    /* +0x014 */ /* struct IRP */ void             *CurrentIrp; 
    /* +0x018 */ /* struct IO_TIMER */ void        *Timer; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long            Flags; 
    /* +0x020 */ unsigned long            Characteristics; 
    /* +0x024 */ struct VPB              *Vpb; 
    /* +0x028 */ void                    *DeviceExtension; 
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long            DeviceType; 
    /* +0x030 */ char                     StackSize; 
    /* +0x034 */ struct _unnamed          Queue; 
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long            AlignmentRequirement; 
    /* +0x060 */ struct KDEVICE_QUEUE     DeviceQueue; 
    /* +0x074 */ struct KDPC              Dpc; 
    /* +0x094 */ unsigned long            ActiveThreadCount; 
    /* +0x098 */ void                    *SecurityDescriptor; 
    /* +0x09c */ struct KEVENT            DeviceLock; 
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned short           SectorSize; 
    /* +0x0ae */ unsigned short           Spare1; 
    /* +0x0b0 */ /* struct DEVOBJ_EXTENSION */ void 
*DeviceObjectExtension; 
    /* +0x0b4 */ void                    *Reserved; 
}; 
 
struct DRIVER_OBJECT { 
    /* +0x000 */ short                    Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ short                    Size; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT    *DeviceObject; 
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long            Flags; 
    /* +0x00c */ void                    *DriverStart; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long            DriverSize; 
    /* +0x014 */ void                    *DriverSection; 
    /* +0x018 */ /* struct DRIVER_EXTENSION */ void *DriverExtension; 
    /* +0x01c */ struct UNICODE_STRING    DriverName; 
    /* +0x024 */ struct UNICODE_STRING   *HardwareDatabase; 
    /* +0x028 */ /* struct FAST_IO_DISPATCH */ void *FastIoDispatch; 
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    /* +0x02c */ void                    *DriverInit; 
    /* +0x030 */ void                    *DriverStartIo; 
    /* +0x034 */ void                    *DriverUnload; 
    /* +0x038 */ void                    *MajorFunction[28]; 
}; 
 
struct FILE_OBJECT { 
    /* +0x000 */ short                           Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ short                           Size; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct DEVICE_OBJECT           *DeviceObject; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct VPB                     *Vpb; 
    /* +0x00c */ void                           *FsContext; 
    /* +0x010 */ void                           *FsContext2; 
    /* +0x014 */ struct SECTION_OBJECT_POINTERS *SectionObjectPointer; 
    /* +0x018 */ void                           *PrivateCacheMap; 
    /* +0x01c */ long                            FinalStatus; 
    /* +0x020 */ struct FILE_OBJECT             *RelatedFileObject; 
    /* +0x024 */ unsigned char                   LockOperation; 
    /* +0x025 */ unsigned char                   DeletePending; 
    /* +0x026 */ unsigned char                   ReadAccess; 
    /* +0x027 */ unsigned char                   WriteAccess; 
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned char                   DeleteAccess; 
    /* +0x029 */ unsigned char                   SharedRead; 
    /* +0x02a */ unsigned char                   SharedWrite; 
    /* +0x02b */ unsigned char                   SharedDelete; 
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned long                   Flags; 
    /* +0x030 */ struct UNICODE_STRING           FileName; 
    /* +0x038 */ long long                       CurrentByteOffset; 
    /* +0x040 */ unsigned long                   Waiters; 
    /* +0x044 */ unsigned long                   Busy; 
    /* +0x048 */ void                           *LastLock; 
    /* +0x04c */ struct KEVENT                   Lock; 
    /* +0x05c */ struct KEVENT                   Event; 




struct EX_PUSH_LOCK { 
    /* +0x000 */ int           Waiting : 1; //LSB 
    /* +0x000 */ int           Exclusive : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int           Shared : 30; 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long Value; 
    /* +0x000 */ void         *Ptr; 
}; 
 
struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *ChainLink; 
    /* +0x004 */ void                          *Object; 
}; 
 
struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *HashBuckets[37]; 
    /* +0x094 */ struct EX_PUSH_LOCK            Lock; 
    /* +0x098 */ struct DEVICE_MAP             *DeviceMap; 
    /* +0x09c */ unsigned long                  SessionId; 
    /* +0x0a0 */ unsigned short                 Reserved; 




struct DEVICE_MAP { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY       *DosDevicesDirectory; 
    /* +0x004 */ struct OBJECT_DIRECTORY       
*GlobalDosDevicesDirectory; 
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long                  ReferenceCount; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long                  DriveMap; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned char                  DriveType[32]; 
}; 
 
struct RTL_DRIVE_LETTER_CURDIR { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned short Flags; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned short Length; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long  TimeStamp; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct STRING  DosPath; 
}; 
 
struct RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned long                  MaximumLength; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long                  Length; 
    /* +0x008 */ unsigned long                  Flags; 
    /* +0x00c */ unsigned long                  DebugFlags; 
    /* +0x010 */ void                          *ConsoleHandle; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned long                  ConsoleFlags; 
    /* +0x018 */ void                          *StandardInput; 
    /* +0x01c */ void                          *StandardOutput; 
    /* +0x020 */ void                          *StandardError; 
    /* +0x024 */ struct CURDIR                  CurrentDirectory; 
    /* +0x030 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          DllPath; 
    /* +0x038 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          ImagePathName;      
    /* +0x040 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          CommandLine;        
    /* +0x048 */ void                          *Environment; 
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long                  StartingX; 
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned long                  StartingY; 
    /* +0x054 */ unsigned long                  CountX; 
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long                  CountY; 
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long                  CountCharsX; 
    /* +0x060 */ unsigned long                  CountCharsY; 
    /* +0x064 */ unsigned long                  FillAttribute; 
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned long                  WindowFlags; 
    /* +0x06c */ unsigned long                  ShowWindowFlags; 
    /* +0x070 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          WindowTitle;       
    /* +0x078 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          DesktopInfo;  
    /* +0x080 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          ShellInfo; 
    /* +0x088 */ struct UNICODE_STRING          RuntimeData; 
    /* +0x090 */ struct RTL_DRIVE_LETTER_CURDIR CurrentDirectores[32]; 
}; 
 
struct PEB { 
    /* +0x000 */ unsigned char        InheritedAddressSpace; 
    /* +0x001 */ unsigned char        ReadImageFileExecOptions; 
    /* +0x002 */ unsigned char        BeingDebugged; 
    /* +0x003 */ unsigned char        SpareBool; 
    /* +0x004 */ void                *Mutant; 
    /* +0x008 */ void                *ImageBaseAddress; 
    /* +0x00c */ struct PEB_LDR_DATA *Ldr; 
54
    /* +0x010 */ struct RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS *ProcessParameters; 
    /* +0x014 */ void                *SubSystemData; 
    /* +0x018 */ void                *ProcessHeap; 
    /* +0x01c */ struct RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION *FastPebLock; 
    /* +0x020 */ void                *FastPebLockRoutine; 
    /* +0x024 */ void                *FastPebUnlockRoutine; 
    /* +0x028 */ unsigned long        EnvironmentUpdateCount; 
    /* +0x02c */ void                *KernelCallbackTable; 
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned long        SystemReserved[1]; 
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long        AtlThunkSList; 
    /* +0x038 */ struct PEB_FREE_BLOCK *FreeList; 
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long        TlsExpansionCounter; 
    /* +0x040 */ void                *TlsBitmap; 
    /* +0x044 */ unsigned long        TlsBitmapBits[2]; 
    /* +0x04c */ void                *ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase; 
    /* +0x050 */ void                *ReadOnlySharedMemoryHeap; 
    /* +0x054 */ void               **ReadOnlyStaticServerData; 
    /* +0x058 */ void                *AnsiCodePageData; 
    /* +0x05c */ void                *OemCodePageData; 
    /* +0x060 */ void                *UnicodeCaseTableData; 
    /* +0x064 */ unsigned long        NumberOfProcessors; 
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned long        NtGlobalFlag; 
    /* +0x070 */ long long            CriticalSectionTimeout; 
    /* +0x078 */ unsigned long        HeapSegmentReserve; 
    /* +0x07c */ unsigned long        HeapSegmentCommit; 
    /* +0x080 */ unsigned long        HeapDeCommitTotalFreeThreshold; 
    /* +0x084 */ unsigned long        HeapDeCommitFreeBlockThreshold; 
    /* +0x088 */ unsigned long        NumberOfHeaps; 
    /* +0x08c */ unsigned long        MaximumNumberOfHeaps; 
    /* +0x090 */ void               **ProcessHeaps; 
    /* +0x094 */ void                *GdiSharedHandleTable; 
    /* +0x098 */ void                *ProcessStarterHelper; 
    /* +0x09c */ unsigned long        GdiDCAttributeList; 
    /* +0x0a0 */ void                *LoaderLock; 
    /* +0x0a4 */ unsigned long        OSMajorVersion; 
    /* +0x0a8 */ unsigned long        OSMinorVersion; 
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned short      *OSBuildNumber; 
    /* +0x0ae */ unsigned short      *OSCSDVersion; 
    /* +0x0b0 */ unsigned long        OSPlatformId; 
    /* +0x0b4 */ unsigned long        ImageSubsystem; 
    /* +0x0b8 */ unsigned long        ImageSubsystemMajorVersion; 
    /* +0x0bc */ unsigned long        ImageSubsystemMinorVersion; 
    /* +0x0c0 */ unsigned long        ImageProcessAffinityMask; 
    /* +0x0c4 */ unsigned long        GdiHandleBuffer[34]; 
    /* +0x14c */ void                *PostProcessInitRoutine; 
    /* +0x150 */ void                *TlsExpansionBitmap; 
    /* +0x154 */ unsigned long        TlsExpansionBitmapBits[32]; 
    /* +0x1d4 */ unsigned long        SessionId; 
    /* +0x1d8 */ unsigned long long   AppCompatFlags; 
    /* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long long   AppCompatFlagsUser; 
    /* +0x1e8 */ void                *pShimData; 
    /* +0x1ec */ void                *AppCompatInfo; 
    /* +0x1f0 */ struct UNICODE_STRING CSDVersion;  
    /* +0x1f8 */ void                *ActivationContextData; 
    /* +0x1fc */ void                *ProcessAssemblyStorageMap; 
    /* +0x200 */ void              *SystemDefaultActivationContextData; 
    /* +0x204 */ void                *SystemAssemblyStorageMap; 
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    /* +0x208 */ unsigned long        MinimumStackCommit;  
}; 
 
struct HARDWARE_PTE { 
    /* +0x000 */ int Valid : 1; //LSB 
    /* +0x000 */ int Write : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int Owner : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int WriteThrough : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int CacheDisable : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int Accessed : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int Dirty : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int LargePage : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int Global : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int CopyOnWrite : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int Prototype : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int Reserved : 1; 
    /* +0x000 */ int PageFrameNumber : 20; 
}; 
 
struct KPROCESS { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ProfileListHead; 
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long            DirectoryTableBase[2]; 
    /* +0x020 */ struct KGDTENTRY         LdtDescriptor; 
    /* +0x028 */ struct KIDTENTRY         Int21Descriptor; 
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned short           IopmOffset; 
    /* +0x032 */ unsigned char            Iopl; 
    /* +0x033 */ unsigned char            Unused; 
    /* +0x034 */ unsigned long            ActiveProcessors; 
    /* +0x038 */ unsigned long            KernelTime; 
    /* +0x03c */ unsigned long            UserTime; 
    /* +0x040 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ReadyListHead; 
    /* +0x048 */ void                    *SwapListEntry;      
    /* +0x04c */ void                    *VdmTrapcHandler; 
    /* +0x050 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ThreadListHead; 
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned long            ProcessLock; 
    /* +0x05c */ unsigned long            Affinity; 
    /* +0x060 */ unsigned short           StackCount; 
    /* +0x062 */ char                     BasePriority; 
    /* +0x063 */ char                     ThreadQuantum; 
    /* +0x064 */ unsigned char            AutoAlignment; 
    /* +0x065 */ unsigned char            State; 
    /* +0x066 */ unsigned char            ThreadSeed; 
    /* +0x067 */ unsigned char            DisableBoost; 
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned char            PowerState; 
    /* +0x069 */ unsigned char            DisableQuantum; 
    /* +0x06a */ unsigned char            IdealNode; 
    /* +0x06b  KEXECUTE_OPTIONS Flags; */ 
    /* +0x06b */ unsigned char            ExecuteOptions; 
}; 
 
struct EPROCESS { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct KPROCESS      Pcb; 
    /* +0x06c */ unsigned long        ProcessLock; 
    /* +0x070 */ unsigned long long   CreateTime; 
    /* +0x078 */ unsigned long long   ExitTime; 
    /* +0x080 */ unsigned long        RunDownProtect; 
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    /* +0x084 */ void                *UniqueProcessId; 
    /* +0x088 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    ActiveProcessLinks; 
    /* +0x090 */ unsigned long        QuotaUsage[3]; 
    /* +0x09c */ unsigned long        QuotaPeak[3]; 
    /* +0x0a8 */ unsigned long        CommitCharge; 
    /* +0x0ac */ unsigned long        PeakVirtualSize; 
    /* +0x0b0 */ unsigned long        VirtualSize; 
    /* +0x0b4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    SessionProcessLinks; 
    /* +0x0bc */ void                *DebugPort; 
    /* +0x0c0 */ void                *ExceptionPort; 
    /* +0x0c4 */ struct HANDLE_TABLE *ObjectTable;     
    /* +0x0c8 */ unsigned long        Token; 
    /* +0x0cc */ struct FAST_MUTEX    WorkingSetLock; 
    /* +0x0ec */ unsigned long        WorkingSetPage; 
    /* +0x0f0 */ struct FAST_MUTEX    AddressCreationLock; 
    /* +0x110 */ unsigned long        HyperSpaceLock; 
    /* +0x114 */ struct ETHREAD      *ForkInProgress; 
    /* +0x118 */ unsigned long        HardwareTrigger; 
    /* +0x11c */ void                *VadRoot; 
    /* +0x120 */ void                *VadHint; 
    /* +0x124 */ void                *CloneRoot; 
    /* +0x128 */ unsigned long        NumberOfPrivatePages; 
    /* +0x12c */ unsigned long        NumberOfLockedPages; 
    /* +0x130 */ void                *Win32Process; 
    /* +0x134 */ void                *Job; /*Points to EJOB*/ 
    /* +0x138 */ void                *SectionObject; 
    /* +0x13c */ void                *SectionBaseAddress; 
    /* +0x140 */ void   *QuotaBlock; /*points to EPROCESS_QUOTA_BLOCK*/ 
    /* +0x144 */ void  *WorkingSetWatch;/*points to PAGEFAULT_HISTORY*/ 
    /* +0x148 */ void                *Win32WindowStation; 
    /* +0x14c */ void                *InheritedFromUniqueProcessId; 
    /* +0x150 */ void                *LdtInformation; 
    /* +0x154 */ void                *VadFreeHint; 
    /* +0x158 */ void                *VdmObjects; 
    /* +0x15c */ struct DEVICE_MAP   *DeviceMap; 
    /* +0x160 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    PhysicalVadList; 
    /* +0x168 */ struct HARDWARE_PTE  PageDirectoryPte; 
    /* +0x16c */ unsigned long        Filler; 
    /* +0x170 */ void                *Session; 
    /* +0x174 */ char                 ImageFileName[16]; 
    /* +0x184 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    JobLinks; 
    /* +0x18c */ void                *LockedPagesList; 
    /* +0x190 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    ThreadListHead; 
    /* +0x198 */ void                *SecurityPort; 
    /* +0x19c */ void                *PaeTop; 
    /* +0x1a0 */ unsigned long        ActiveThreads; 
    /* +0x1a4 */ unsigned long        GrantedAccess; 
    /* +0x1a8 */ unsigned long        DefaultHardErrorProcessing; 
    /* +0x1ac */ long                 LastThreadExitStatus; 
    /* +0x1b0 */ struct PEB          *Peb; 
    /* +0x1b4 */ unsigned long        PrefetchTrace; 
    /* +0x1b8 */ unsigned long long   ReadOperationCount; 
    /* +0x1c0 */ unsigned long long   WriteOperationCount; 
    /* +0x1c8 */ unsigned long long   OtherOperationCount; 
    /* +0x1d0 */ unsigned long long   ReadTransferCount; 
    /* +0x1d8 */ unsigned long long   WriteTransferCount; 
    /* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long long   OtherTransferCount; 
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    /* +0x1e8 */ unsigned long        CommitChargeLimit; 
    /* +0x1ec */ unsigned long        CommitChargePeak; 
    /* +0x1f0 */ void                *AweInfo; 
    /* +0x1f4 */ unsigned long        SeAuditProcessCreationInfo; 
    /* +0x1f8 */ struct MMSUPPORT     Vm; 
    /* +0x238 */ unsigned long        LastFaultCount; 
    /* +0x23c */ unsigned long        ModifiedPageCount; 
    /* +0x240 */ unsigned long        NumberOfVads; 
    /* +0x244 */ unsigned long        JobStatus; 
    /* +0x248 */ unsigned long        Flags; 
    /* +0x24c */ long                 ExitStatus; 
    /* +0x250 */ unsigned short       NextPageColor; 
    /* +0x252 */ unsigned char        SubSystemMinorVersion; 
    /* +0x253 */ unsigned char        SubSystemMajorVersion; 
    /* +0x254 */ unsigned short       SubSystemVersion; 
    /* +0x256 */ unsigned char        PriorityClass; 
    /* +0x257 */ unsigned char        WorkingSetAcquiredUnsafe; 
    /* +0x258 */ unsigned long        Cookie; 
}; 
 
struct CLIENT_ID { 
    /* +0x000 */ void *UniqueProcess; 
    /* +0x004 */ void *UniqueThread; 
}; 
 
struct KAPC_STATE { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY  ApcListHead[2]; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct KPROCESS   *Process; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned char      KernelApcInProgress; 
    /* +0x015 */ unsigned char      KernelApcPending; 
    /* +0x016 */ unsigned char      UserApcPending; 
 /* +0x017 */ unsigned char      Trailer; 
}; 
 
struct KQUEUE { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        EntryListHead; 
    /* +0x018 */ unsigned long            CurrentCount; 
    /* +0x01c */ unsigned long            MaximumCount; 
    /* +0x020 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ThreadListHead; 
}; 
 
struct KTIMER { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER Header; 
    /* +0x010 */ unsigned long long       DueTime; 
    /* +0x018 */ struct LIST_ENTRY        TimerListEntry; 
    /* +0x020 */ struct KDPC             *Dpc; 
    /* +0x024 */ long                     Period; 
}; 
 
struct KAPC { 
    /* +0x000 */ short                    Type; 
    /* +0x002 */ short                    Size; 
    /* +0x004 */ unsigned long            Spare0; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct KTHREAD          *Thread; 
    /* +0x00c */ struct LIST_ENTRY        ApcListEntry; 
    /* +0x014 */ void                    *KernelRoutine; 
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    /* +0x018 */ void                    *RundownRoutine; 
    /* +0x01c */ void                    *NormalRoutine; 
    /* +0x020 */ void                    *NormalContext; 
    /* +0x024 */ void                    *SystemArgument1; 
    /* +0x028 */ void                    *SystemArgument2; 
    /* +0x02c */ char                     ApcStateIndex; 
    /* +0x02d */ char                     ApcMode; 
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned char            Inserted; 
 /* +0x02f */ char                     Trailer; 
}; 
 
struct KWAIT_BLOCK { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct LIST_ENTRY   WaitListEntry; 
    /* +0x008 */ struct KTHREAD     *Thread; 
    /* +0x00c */ void               *Object; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK *NextWaitBlock; 
    /* +0x014 */ unsigned short      WaitKey; 
    /* +0x016 */ unsigned short      WaitType; 
}; 
 
struct KTHREAD { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct DISPATCHER_HEADER  Header; 
    /* +0x010 */ struct LIST_ENTRY         MutantListHead; 
    /* +0x018 */ void                     *InitialStack; 
    /* +0x01c */ void                     *StackLimit; 
    /* +0x020 */ void                     *Teb; 
    /* +0x024 */ void                     *TlsArray; 
    /* +0x028 */ void                     *KernelStack; 
    /* +0x02c */ unsigned char             DebugActive; 
    /* +0x02d */ unsigned char             State; 
    /* +0x02e */ unsigned char             Alerted[2]; 
    /* +0x030 */ unsigned char             Iopl; 
    /* +0x031 */ unsigned char             NpxState; 
    /* +0x032 */ char                      Saturation; 
    /* +0x033 */ char                      Priority; 
    /* +0x034 */ struct KAPC_STATE         ApcState; 
    /* +0x04c */ unsigned long             ContextSwitches; 
    /* +0x050 */ unsigned char             IdleSwapBlock; 
    /* +0x051 */ unsigned char             Spare0[3]; 
    /* +0x054 */ long                      WaitStatus; 
    /* +0x058 */ unsigned char             WaitIrql; 
    /* +0x059 */ char                      WaitMode; 
    /* +0x05a */ unsigned char             WaitNext; 
    /* +0x05b */ unsigned char             WaitReason; 
    /* +0x05c */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK       *WaitBlockList; 
    /* +0x060 */ struct LIST_ENTRY         WaitListEntry; 
    /* +0x068 */ unsigned long             WaitTime; 
    /* +0x06c */ char                      BasePriority; 
    /* +0x06d */ unsigned char             DecrementCount; 
    /* +0x06e */ char                      PriorityDecrement; 
    /* +0x06f */ char                      Quantum; 
    /* +0x070 */ struct KWAIT_BLOCK        WaitBlock[4]; 
    /* +0x0d0 */ void                     *LegoData; 
    /* +0x0d4 */ unsigned long             KernelApcDisable; 
    /* +0x0d8 */ unsigned long             UserAffinity; 
    /* +0x0dc */ unsigned char             SystemAffinityActive; 
    /* +0x0dd */ unsigned char             PowerState; 
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    /* +0x0de */ unsigned char             NpxIrql; 
    /* +0x0df */ unsigned char             InitialNode; 
    /* +0x0e0 */ void                     *ServiceTable; 
    /* +0x0e4 */ struct KQUEUE            *Queue; 
    /* +0x0e8 */ unsigned long             ApcQueueLock; 
    /* +0x0f0 */ struct KTIMER             Timer; 
    /* +0x118 */ struct LIST_ENTRY         QueueListEntry; 
    /* +0x120 */ unsigned long             SoftAffinity; 
    /* +0x124 */ unsigned long             Affinity; 
    /* +0x128 */ unsigned char             Preempted; 
    /* +0x129 */ unsigned char             ProcessReadyQueue; 
    /* +0x12a */ unsigned char             KernelStackResident; 
    /* +0x12b */ unsigned char             NextProcessor; 
    /* +0x12c */ void                     *CallbackStack; 
    /* +0x130 */ void                     *Win32Thread; 
    /* +0x134 */ void              *TrapFrame;/*points to KTRAP_FRAME*/ 
    /* +0x138 */ struct KAPC_STATE        *ApcStatePointer[2]; 
    /* +0x140 */ char                      PreviousMode; 
    /* +0x141 */ unsigned char             EnableStackSwap; 
    /* +0x142 */ unsigned char             LargeStack; 
    /* +0x143 */ unsigned char             ResourceIndex; 
    /* +0x144 */ unsigned long             KernelTime; 
    /* +0x148 */ unsigned long             UserTime; 
    /* +0x14c */ struct KAPC_STATE         SavedApcState; 
    /* +0x164 */ unsigned char             Alertable; 
    /* +0x165 */ unsigned char             ApcStateIndex; 
    /* +0x166 */ unsigned char             ApcQueueable; 
    /* +0x167 */ unsigned char             AutoAlignment; 
    /* +0x168 */ void                     *StackBase; 
    /* +0x16c */ struct KAPC               SuspendApc; 
    /* +0x19c */ struct KSEMAPHORE         SuspendSemaphore; 
    /* +0x1b0 */ struct LIST_ENTRY         ThreadListEntry; 
    /* +0x1b8 */ char                      FreezeCount; 
    /* +0x1b9 */ char                      SuspendCount; 
    /* +0x1ba */ unsigned char             IdealProcessor; 
    /* +0x1bb */ unsigned char             DisableBoost; 
    /* +0x1bc */ long long                 Trailer; 
}; 
 
struct ETHREAD { 
    /* +0x000 */ struct KTHREAD       Tcb; 
    /* +0x1c0 */ long long            CreateTime; 
    /* +0x1c8 */ long long            ExitTime; 
    /* +0x1d0 */ long                 ExitStatus; 
    /* +0x1d4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    PostBlockList; 
    /* +0x1dc */ void                *TerminationPort; 
    /* +0x1e0 */ unsigned long        ActiveTimerListLock; 
    /* +0x1e4 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    ActiveTimerListHead; 
    /* +0x1ec */ struct CLIENT_ID     Cid; 
    /* +0x1f4 */ struct KSEMAPHORE    LpcReplySemaphore; 
    /* +0x208 */ void                *LpcReplyMessage; 
    /* +0x20c */ void                *ImpersonationInfo; 
    /* +0x210 */ struct LIST_ENTRY    IrpList; 
    /* +0x218 */ unsigned long        TopLevelIrp; 
    /* +0x21c */ void                *DeviceToVerify; 
    /* +0x220 */ struct EPROCESS     *ThreadsProcess; 
    /* +0x224 */ void                *StartAddress; 
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    /* +0x228 */ void                *Win32StartAddress; 
    /* +0x22c */ struct LIST_ENTRY    ThreadListEntry; 
    /* +0x234 */ unsigned long        RundownProtect; 
    /* +0x238 */ unsigned long        ThreadLock; 
    /* +0x23c */ unsigned long        LpcReplyMessageId; 
    /* +0x240 */ unsigned long        ReadClusterSize; 
    /* +0x244 */ unsigned long        GrantedAccess; 
    /* +0x248 */ unsigned long        CrossThreadFlags; 
    /* +0x24c */ unsigned long        SameThreadPasssiveFlags; 
    /* +0x250 */ unsigned long        SameThreadApcFlags; 
    /* +0x254 */ unsigned char        ForwardClusterOnly; 












Author Jared Stimson 
 
Description: This is a tool used to search for processes using various 













#define KERNEL_OFFSET    0x80000000 
#define SIZEOF_PROC    0x260 
#define SIZEOF_THRD    0x258 
#define PAGESIZE    0x1000 
#define TOTAL_TYPES    32 
 
int PAGEFILE = 0; 
 
/********************************************************************** 
Prints the usage statement. 
Input: None 
Output: Usage Statement 
**********************************************************************/ 
void print_usage(){ 
 fprintf (stderr, "Usage: ./eprocess2DEC07.exe option <imageFile> 
<args>\n" 
  " -l Walk active process list\n" 
  " -s Scan image for process structures\n" 
  " -t Translates Virtual to Physical Address\n" 
  " -d Dump process information\n" 
  " -i Identify Operating System\n" 
  " -p Gets the number of pages in memory\n" 




Convert the hex string to int. 




unsigned int hstr_i(char *cptr){ 
      unsigned int i, j = 0; 
      while (cptr && *cptr && isxdigit(*cptr)){ 
            i = *cptr++ - '0'; 
            if (9 < i) 
                  i -= 7; 
            j <<= 4; 
            j |= (i & 0x0f); 
      } 




Convert the Windows time format to Unix format and convert the Unix 
time  
to GMT with the existing Linux Time library functions. 
 
       Unix    epoch is 1970-01-01 00:00:00 resolution is seconds 
       Windows epoch is 1601-01-01 00:00:00 resolution is 100ns 
**********************************************************************/ 
void win_time(long long winTime, char date[]){ 
 long unixTime = 0; 
   unixTime = (long long) (winTime/10000000) - (long long) 
11644473600ULL; 




Translates virtual address to a valid physical address, if the virtual  
address is mapped to a physical address. 
Input: Long, Page Directory Base, File descriptor, Size of file. 
Output: Pyisical offset of virtual address (long) 
**********************************************************************/ 
long virtual_to_physical(long ptr32, long pageDirBase, FILE * in,long 
size) { 
 if(size > 256000000){ 
  if((ptr32 & 0xf0000000) <= 0x80000000 ) 
   return ptr32 - KERNEL_OFFSET; 
 } 
     unsigned long pageDirectoryIndex = ptr32 & 0xffc00000; 
     pageDirectoryIndex = pageDirectoryIndex >> 22; 
     unsigned long pageTableIndex = ptr32 & 0x003ff000; 
     pageTableIndex = pageTableIndex >> 12; 
     unsigned long byteIndex = ptr32 & 0x00000fff; 
     ptr32 = pageDirBase + pageDirectoryIndex * 4; 
     fseek(in,ptr32,SEEK_SET); 
     fread(&ptr32,4,1,in); 
     if( (ptr32 & 0x01) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) 
== 0x8)) { 
  ptr32 = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000) + pageTableIndex * 4; 
  if(ptr32 == 0) return -1; 
      fseek(in,ptr32,SEEK_SET); 
      fread(&ptr32,4,1,in); 
  if((ptr32 & 0x01) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0) || ((ptr32 & 
0xc00) == 0x8)) { 
   ptr32 = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000) + byteIndex; 
       return ptr32; 
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      } else return -1; 




Returns the page Table Base. 
Input: Pointer to Page Table Base 
Output: Contents of PTB 
**********************************************************************/ 
long get_PTB(long ptr32) { 
 long pageTableBase = 0; 
 if((ptr32 & 1)){ 
  pageTableBase = ptr32 & 0xfffff000; 
  return pageTableBase; 
 }  
 else { 
  if(!(ptr32 & 0xc00)){ 
   if((ptr32 & 0x1e) == 0){ 
    pageTableBase = (ptr32 & 0xfffff000); 
    if(!pageTableBase) 
     return 0; 
    pageTableBase = pageTableBase + 1; 
    return pageTableBase; 
   } else 
    return 3; 
  } 
  if(ptr32 & 0x400) 
   pageTableBase = pageTableBase + 2; 
 } 




Returns the page Base Address. 
Input: Pointer to Page Base Address 
Output: Contents of Page Base Address 
**********************************************************************/ 
long get_PBA(long ptr32) { 
 long pageBaseAddr = 0; 
 if(ptr32 & 0x100){ 
  return 5; 
 } 
 if((ptr32 & 1) || ((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0x800)){ 
  pageBaseAddr = ptr32 & 0xfffff000; 
  return pageBaseAddr; 
 } else { 
  if((ptr32 & 0xc00) == 0){ 
   if((ptr32 & 0x1e) == 0){ 
    pageBaseAddr = ptr32 & 0xfffff000; 
    if(!pageBaseAddr) 
     return 0; 
    pageBaseAddr = pageBaseAddr + 1; 
    return pageBaseAddr; 
   } else 
    return 3; 
  } 
  if(ptr32 & 0x400) 
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   return 2; 
 } 




Convert unicode string to ascii string and put it in tempString. 
Input: unicode string 
Output: ascii string 
**********************************************************************/ 
void unicode_to_ascii(char *string, unsigned short length) { 
   if( length <= 0 ) 
      return; 
   int m; 
   char *tempString = malloc(length/2); 
   for(m=0;m<length;m+=2) { 
  memcpy(tempString+m/2,string+m,1); 
   } 
   memset(string,0,length); 
   memcpy(string,tempString,length/2); 
   free(tempString); 




Compares 2 4-byte numbers for greater than, less than, or equal to 
condition. 
Input: 2 numbers 
Output: -1,0,1 
**********************************************************************/ 
int longcmp( const void *n1, const void *n2 ) { 
   unsigned long a = *(unsigned long *)n1; 
   unsigned long b = *(unsigned long *)n2; 
   




Used to lookup the machine type for an image. 
Input: machine number, empty string 
Output: machine name 
**********************************************************************/ 
void lookup_machine(int machineNumber, char machineName[]){ 
 switch (machineNumber) { 
  case 0x014c: 
   strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386"); 
   break; 
  case 0x014d: 
   strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I860"); 
   break; 
  case 0x0200: 
   strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64"); 
   break; 
  case 0x8664: 
   strcpy(machineName,"IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64"); 
   break; 
  default: 
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   strcpy(machineName,"Machine Unknown"); 





Returns String with file header characteristic information. 
Input: Empty string 
Output: Characteristics of file image 
**********************************************************************/ 
void get_file_header_characteristics(int charsIn, char 
characteristics[]){ 
 if(charsIn & 0x0001) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0002) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0004) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0008) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0010) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_AGGRESIVE_WS_TRIM\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0020) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0080) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0100) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0200) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0400) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x0800) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x1000) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x2000) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_DLL\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x4000) 
  strcat(characteristics, "\tIMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY\n"); 
 if(charsIn & 0x8000) 
  strcat(characteristics, 
"\tIMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI\n"); 




Returns String with Optional Header Subsystem Information. 
Input: Empty string 
Output: File subsystem information 
66
**********************************************************************/ 
void get_optional_header_subsystem(int subIn, char subSystem[]){ 
 switch (subIn) { 
  case 0: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN"); 
   break; 
  case 1: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE"); 
   break; 
  case 2: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI"); 
   break; 
  case 3: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI"); 
   break; 
  case 5: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_OS2_CUI"); 
   break; 
  case 7: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI"); 
   break; 
  case 8: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE_WINDOWS"); 
   break; 
  case 9: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI"); 
   break; 
  case 14: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX"); 
   break; 
  default: 
   strcpy(subSystem,"Machine Unknown"); 






Prints Data Directory Information 
Input: Image Optional Header 
Output: Data Directory Information 
 
Directory Entries  
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT         0  
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT         1 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE       2 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION      3 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY       4 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC      5 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG          6 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT      7 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR      8 
#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS            9 





void print_data_directories(struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader){ 
  printf("\n\t\tData Directory Information\n"); 
  printf("\n%-27s     %-10s     %-10s\n", "Data Directory", 
"RVA", "Size"); 
  printf("%-27s     %-10s     %-10s\n", "--------------", "--
-", "----"); 
  char directory[11][32] = {"Export Directory", "Import 
Directory", "Resource Directory",  
      "Exception Directory","Security 
Directory", "Base Relocation Table",  
      "Debug Directory", "Description 
String", "Machine Value (MIPS GP)", 
      "TLS Directory", "Load 
Configuration Directory"}; 
  int i = 0; 
  for(i;i < 11; i++){ 
   if((optHeader->DataDirectory[i].VirtualAddress  > 0) 
&& (optHeader->DataDirectory[i].Size > 0)) 
    printf("%-32s0x%.8x     0x%.8x\n",  
     directory[i],  
     optHeader-
>DataDirectory[i].VirtualAddress,  
     optHeader->DataDirectory[i].Size); 




Prints section header information. 
Input: File, offset, Image section header 
Output: Section information 
**********************************************************************/ 
void print_section_data(FILE *in, int offset, struct 
_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sectHeader){ 
 fseek(in,offset,SEEK_SET); 
 fread(sectHeader,sizeof(struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER),1,in); 
 memcpy(sectHeader->Name + 8,"",1); 
 printf("%-9s0x%.8x  0x%.8x  0x%.8x  0x%.8x  0x%.8x\n", 
  sectHeader->Name,  
  sectHeader->Misc.VirtualSize,  
  sectHeader->VirtualAddress,    
  sectHeader->SizeOfRawData, 
  sectHeader->PointerToRawData,  




Calculates statistics about memory usage. 
Input: Eprocess block, File, page file, size 
Output: Memory Stats 
**********************************************************************/ 
void get_memory_stats(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, FILE *mem, FILE 
*pageFile, int size){ 
 long PDE[1024]; 
 long PTE[1024]; 
 long pageTableBase = 0; 
 int i = 0; 
 int valid = 0; 
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 int paged = 0; 
 int zero = 0; 
 int global = 0; 
 int prototype = 0; 
 int unknown = 0; 
 fseek(mem,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],SEEK_SET); 
 fread(PDE,4096,1,mem); 
 for(i;i < 1024;i++){ 
  pageTableBase = get_PTB(PDE[i]); 
  if(pageTableBase != 0) { 
   switch (pageTableBase & 0xf) { 
    case 0:  
     fseek(mem,pageTableBase,SEEK_SET); 
     fread(PTE,4096,1,mem); 
     break; 
    case 1: 
     if(pageFile != NULL) { 
     
 fseek(pageFile,pageTableBase,SEEK_SET); 
      fread(PTE,4096,1,pageFile); 
     } else 
      pageTableBase = 0; 
     break; 
    default: 
     pageTableBase = 0; 
     break; 
   } 
   if(pageTableBase != 0) { 
    int j = 0; 
    long pageBaseAddr = 0; 
    for(j;j<1024;j++){ 
     pageBaseAddr = get_PBA(PTE[j]); 
     if(pageBaseAddr != 0) { 
      switch (pageBaseAddr & 0xf) { 
       case 0: 
        valid++; 
        break; 
       case 1: 
        paged++; 
        break; 
       case 2: 
        prototype++; 
        break; 
       case 3: 
        unknown++; 
        break; 
       case 5: 
        global++; 
        break; 
      } 
     } 
    } 
   } 





  valid, prototype, global, paged, unknown); 
} 
/********************************************************************** 
Dumps the processes memory pages from the image and optionaly the 
paging 
file if available using the Page Directories. 
**********************************************************************/ 
void get_memory(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, FILE *mem, FILE *pageFile, 
int size){ 
   char pname[24]; 
   char processID[8]; 
   char fname[56]; 
 char iname[56]; 
   char directory[24] = "mkdir "; 
   char deldir[24] = "rm -rf "; 
 byte buffer[4096]; 
   long pid = 0; 
 long PDE[1024]; 
 long PTE[1024]; 
 long pageTableBase = 0; 
 char vAddr[20]; 
 int i = 0; 
 int valid = 0; 
 int paged = 0; 
 int zero = 0; 
 int global = 0; 
 int prototype = 0; 
 int unknown = 0; 
 FILE *fd1 = NULL; 
 FILE *fd2 = NULL; 
 fseek(mem,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],SEEK_SET); 
 fread(PDE,4096,1,mem); 
 pid = (long)eprocess->UniqueProcessId; 
   snprintf(processID,sizeof(processID),"\x5f%lu",pid); 
   strncpy(pname,eprocess->ImageFileName,sizeof(pname)); 
   strncat(pname,processID,sizeof(pname)); 
   strncat(directory,pname,sizeof(directory)-strlen(directory)); 
 if(fopen(pname,"r") != NULL ) { 
  fprintf(stderr,"Error: Directory %s already 
exists!\n",pname); 
  exit(0); 
   }  
   system(directory); 
 strncpy(fname,pname,sizeof(fname)); 





 fd1 = fopen(fname,"wb"); 
 fd2 = fopen(iname,"wb"); 
 if( fd1 == NULL ){ 
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open %s!\n",fname); 
  exit(0); 
     } 
 if( fd2 == NULL ){ 
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open %s!\n",iname); 
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  exit(0); 
     } 
 fprintf(stderr,"Creating Working Set Files, Please Wait\n"); 
 for(i;i < 1024;i++){ 
  pageTableBase = get_PTB(PDE[i]); 
  if(pageTableBase != 0) { 
   switch (pageTableBase & 0xf) { 
    case 0:  
     fseek(mem,pageTableBase,SEEK_SET); 
     fread(PTE,4096,1,mem); 
     break; 
    case 1: 
     if(pageFile != NULL) { 
     
 fseek(pageFile,pageTableBase,SEEK_SET); 
      fread(PTE,4096,1,pageFile); 
     } else 
      pageTableBase = 0; 
     break; 
    default: 
     pageTableBase = 0; 
     break; 
   } 
   if(pageTableBase != 0) { 
    int j = 0; 
    long pageBaseAddr = 0; 
    for(j;j<1024;j++){ 
     pageBaseAddr = get_PBA(PTE[j]); 
     if(pageBaseAddr != 0) { 
      sprintf(vAddr,"%8x",((i << 22) + (j 
<< 12))); 
      switch (pageBaseAddr & 0xf) { 
       case 0: 
       
 fseek(mem,pageBaseAddr,SEEK_SET); 
       
 fread(buffer,1,sizeof(buffer),mem); 
       
 fwrite(buffer,1,sizeof(buffer),fd1); 
       
 fprintf(fd2,"%s\n",vAddr); 
        valid++; 
        break; 
       case 1: 
        if(pageFile != NULL){ 
        
 fseek(pageFile,pageBaseAddr,SEEK_SET); 
        
 fread(buffer,1,sizeof(buffer),pageFile); 
        
 fwrite(buffer,1,sizeof(buffer),fd1); 
        
 fprintf(fd2,"%s\n",vAddr); 
        } 
        paged++; 
        break; 
       case 2: 
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        prototype++; 
        break; 
       case 3: 
        unknown++; 
        break; 
       case 5: 
        global++; 
        break; 
      } 
     } 
    } 
   } 






  valid, prototype, global, paged, unknown); 
} 
/********************************************************************** 
Prints Optional Header information from process image. 
Input: Image ofptional header 
Output: Prints optional header information 
**********************************************************************/ 
void print_optional_header(struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader){ 
  char subSystem[] = "Subsystem Unknown"; 
  get_optional_header_subsystem(optHeader->Subsystem, 
subSystem); 
  printf("\n\t\tOptional Header\n"); 
  printf("Magic Number:                   0x%x\n", optHeader-
>Magic); 
  printf("Subsystem:                      %s\n", subSystem); 
  printf("Image Base Address:             0x%x\n", optHeader-
>ImageBase); 
  printf("Address of Entry Point:         0x%x (RVA)\n", 
optHeader->AddressOfEntryPoint); 
  printf("Code Base Address:              0x%x (RVA)\n", 
optHeader->BaseOfCode); 
  printf("Data Base Address:              0x%x (RVA)\n", 
optHeader->BaseOfData); 
  printf("Major OS Version:               %d\n", optHeader-
>MajorOperatingSystemVersion); 
  printf("Minor OS Version:               %d\n", optHeader-
>MinorOperatingSystemVersion); 
  printf("Size of Stack Reserved:         0x%x (%d bytes)\n", 
optHeader->SizeOfStackReserve, optHeader->SizeOfStackReserve); 
  printf("Number of RVA and Sizes:        0x%x\n", optHeader-




Prints DOS Header informaiton from process image. 
Input: File, Image Dos header 
Output: Dos header information 
**********************************************************************/ 
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void print_dos_header(FILE * in,struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER 
*dosHeader,long imgBaseOffset){ 
 printf("\n\t\tDOS Header\n"); 
 printf("e_magic:                        0x%x\n",dosHeader-
>e_magic); 
 printf("e_lfanew:                       0x%x\n",dosHeader-
>e_lfanew); 
 int ntHeader = 0; 
 fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew, SEEK_SET); 
 fread(&ntHeader,2,1,in); 




Prints File Header informaiton. 
Input: Image File Header 
Output: Prints file header information 
**********************************************************************/ 
void print_file_header(struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER *fileHeader){ 
 char machineName[] = "Machine Unknown"; 
 char timeStamp[32]; 
 char characteristics[256]; 
 strcpy(characteristics,"\n"); 
 lookup_machine(fileHeader->Machine,machineName); 
 printf("\n\t\tFile Header\n"); 
 printf("Machine Type:                   %s\n", machineName); 
 printf("Number of Sections:             %d\n", fileHeader-
>NumberOfSections); 
 win_time(fileHeader->TimeDateStamp, timeStamp); 
 printf("Time Stamp:                     %s\n", timeStamp); 








Prints the process image information. 
Input: Eprocess block, file, size, binary verbose 
Output: kernel image information 
**********************************************************************/ 
void print_image_info(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, FILE * in, long size, 
int b){ 
 struct PEB *peb; 
 int peb_offset = 0; 
 int imgBaseOffset = 0; 
 int address = 0; 
 byte buf[1000]; 
 peb = malloc(sizeof(struct PEB)); 
 peb_offset = virtual_to_physical((long) eprocess->Peb,eprocess-
>Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size); 
 fseek(in,(long) peb_offset,SEEK_SET); 
 fread(peb,sizeof(struct PEB),1,in); 
 imgBaseOffset = virtual_to_physical((long) peb-
>ImageBaseAddress,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size); 
 if(imgBaseOffset != -1){ 
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  printf("\nImgage Base Offset:             
0x%x\n",imgBaseOffset); 
  struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dosHeader; 
  dosHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER)); 
  fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset, SEEK_SET); 
  fread(dosHeader,64,1,in); 
  print_dos_header(in,dosHeader,imgBaseOffset); 
  struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER *fileHeader; 
  fileHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER)); 
  fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew + 4, 
SEEK_SET); 
  fread(fileHeader,sizeof(struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER),1,in); 
  print_file_header(fileHeader); 
  struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader; 
  optHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER)); 
  fseek(in,imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew + 
24,SEEK_SET); 
  fread(optHeader,sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER),1,in); 
  print_optional_header(optHeader); 
  print_data_directories(optHeader); 
  printf("\n\t\tSection Information\n"); 
  struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sectHeader[fileHeader-
>NumberOfSections]; 
  printf("\nName     Virt Size   Virt Addr   rData Ofs   
rData Size  Char\n"); 
  printf("----     ---------   ---------   ---------   ------
----  ----\n"); 
  int i = 0; 
  for(i;i < fileHeader->NumberOfSections;i++){ 
   sectHeader[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)); 
   print_section_data(in, imgBaseOffset + dosHeader-
>e_lfanew + 24 + 96 + 8*optHeader->NumberOfRvaAndSizes + 40*i, 
sectHeader[i]); 
   if(b == 1) { 
    int numPages = sectHeader[i]-
>SizeOfRawData/0x1000; 
    printf("\nThere are %d pages in this 
section\n\n", numPages); 
    int j; 
    for(j = 0;j < numPages;j++){ 
     int vAddr = (long) peb->ImageBaseAddress 
+ (long) sectHeader[i]->VirtualAddress + 0x1000*j; 
     int pageAddr = virtual_to_physical((long) 
vAddr,eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0], in, size); 
     if(pageAddr != -1){ 
      printf("0x%.8x (0x%.8x)\n",  vAddr, 
pageAddr); 
     } 
    } 
   } 






Prints a report of information found in the Eprocess block. 
Input: Eprocess block, count, offset 
Output: Process information 
**********************************************************************/ 
void print_process_report(struct EPROCESS *eprocess, int count, int 
offset) { 
   char created[32]; 
 win_time(eprocess->CreateTime, created); 
   printf("%3d |%-20s|%8d|%8d|%25s| %10.8p | %10.8p |\n", 
  count, 
    eprocess->ImageFileName, 
    eprocess->UniqueProcessId, 
    eprocess->InheritedFromUniqueProcessId, 
    created, 
  offset, 
  eprocess->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0]); 




Calculates the size of the Image file.  Used to determin the VAT 
method. 
Input: Image file 
Output: Size of file 
**********************************************************************/ 
long file_size(FILE *f){ 
 long cur_pos, length; 
  cur_pos = ftell(f); 
  fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);   // set pointer to end of file 
  length=ftell(f);   // offset in bytes from file's beginning 
  fseek(f, cur_pos, SEEK_SET);  // restore original position 




Checks if memory block contains a valid process. 
Input: Eprocess block 
Output: 1 if not process, 0 if it is 
**********************************************************************/ 
int check_process(struct EPROCESS *procTest){ 
 int check = 1; 
 if((procTest->Pcb.Header.Type != 0x03) || (procTest-
>Pcb.Header.Size != 0x1b)){ 
   check = 0; 
  } else if (procTest->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] == 0){ 
   check = 0; 
   } else if ((procTest->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] % 
0x1000) != 0){ 
    check = 0; 
    } else if(((long) procTest-
>Pcb.ThreadListHead.Flink < KERNEL_OFFSET) || ((long) procTest-
>Pcb.ThreadListHead.Blink < KERNEL_OFFSET)){ 
     check = 0; 
     } else if((procTest-
>WorkingSetLock.Event.Type != 0x01) || (procTest-
>WorkingSetLock.Event.Size != 0x04)){ 
      check = 0; 
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      } 




Scans memory image for the active process head.  Used when enumerating  
process list. 
Input: File and offset to start search 
Output: Offset to active process head 
**********************************************************************/ 
int get_active_process_head(FILE * in, int offset){ 
 int check = 1; 
 struct EPROCESS *procTest; 
 procTest = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
 while(!feof(in)){ 
  check = 1; 
  fseek(in,offset,SEEK_SET); 
  fread(procTest,SIZEOF_PROC,1,in);  
  if((check_process(procTest) == 1) && (strcmp(procTest-
>ImageFileName,"System") == 0)){ 
   free(procTest); 
   return offset; 
  } 
  offset +=8; 
 } 
 free(procTest); 




Prints process image information to the screen. 
Input: File, size, offset to process block as ascii hex, binary 
pagefile present 
Output: Prints process reports 
**********************************************************************/ 
void dump_process_image(FILE * in,long size, char *process_address, int 
b) { 
   struct EPROCESS *procCounter; 
   int count = 0; 
 long procAddr = hstr_i(process_address); //0x21fe020 notepad.exe 
laptopMem.dump 
 procCounter = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
   fseek(in,procAddr,SEEK_SET); 
   fread(procCounter,sizeof(struct EPROCESS),1,in); 
 if(check_process(procCounter) == 1){ 
  printf("    |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s 
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","       Time","  Offset","    PDB"); 
  printf("     --------------------  -------  -------  ------
------------------ ------------ ------------  \n"); 
  print_process_report(procCounter, count, procAddr); 
  print_image_info(procCounter, in, size, b); 
    free(procCounter); 
  printf("\n\n"); 
 } 
 else { 
  printf("Process not Found!"); 






Uses the location of the Kernel Executable Image to identify which OS 
is running. 
Input: Image Base Address 
Output: Operating System 
**********************************************************************/ 
void identify_kernel(long imgBaseOffset) { 
 switch (imgBaseOffset) { 
  case 0x400000: 
   printf("Windows 2000\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x4d4000: 
   printf("Windows XP\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x4d0000: 
   printf("Windows XP\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x4d5000: 
   printf("Windows XP\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0xa02000: 
   printf("Windows XP\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x4d7000: 
   printf("Windows XP Service Pack 2\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x4de000: 
   printf("Windows 2003\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x800000: 
   printf("Windows 2003 Service Pack 1\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x2000000: 
   printf("Windows Vista Beta 2\n"); 
   break; 
  case 0x1800000: 
   printf("Windows Vista RC1\n"); 
   break; 




Looks for Kernel Address Space to identify the Operating System. 
Input: FIle, Size, Image Base Address, binary verbose 
Output: Operating System and Kernel Data 
**********************************************************************/ 
void check_kernel(FILE * in,long size, long imgBaseOffset, int b) { 
 struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dosHeader; 
 dosHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER)); 
 fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset, SEEK_SET); 
 fread(dosHeader,64,1,in); 
 if(dosHeader->e_magic == 0x5a4d){ 
  identify_kernel(imgBaseOffset); 
  if(b == 1) { 
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   printf("\nImage Base Offset:             
0x%x\n",imgBaseOffset); 
   print_dos_header(in,dosHeader,imgBaseOffset); 
   struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER *fileHeader; 
   fileHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER)); 
   fseek(in,(long) imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew + 
4, SEEK_SET); 
   fread(fileHeader,sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER),1,in); 
   print_file_header(fileHeader); 
   struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER *optHeader; 
   optHeader = malloc(sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER)); 
   fseek(in,imgBaseOffset + dosHeader->e_lfanew + 
24,SEEK_SET); 
   fread(optHeader,sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER),1,in); 
   print_optional_header(optHeader); 
   print_data_directories(optHeader); 
   printf("\n\t\tSection Information\n"); 
   struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sectHeader[fileHeader-
>NumberOfSections]; 
   printf("\nName     Virt Size   Virt Addr   rData Ofs   
rData Size  Char\n"); 
   printf("----     ---------   ---------   ---------   
----------  ----\n"); 
   int i = 0; 
   for(i;i < fileHeader->NumberOfSections;i++){ 
    sectHeader[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct 
_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)); 
    print_section_data(in, imgBaseOffset + 
dosHeader->e_lfanew + 24 + 96 + 8*optHeader->NumberOfRvaAndSizes + 
40*i, sectHeader[i]); 
   } 






Performs OS detection of a RAM dump by locating the kernel base address 
and parsing the ResourceTable from the PE file located at that address. 
Input: File, Size, binary verbose 
Output: Operating System 
**********************************************************************/ 
void osid(FILE * in,long size,int b){ 
 int os_type[10] = 
{0x80400000,0x804d4000,0x804d0000,0x804d5000,0x80a02000,0x804d7000,0x80
4de000,0x80800000,0x82000000,0x81800000}; 
 int i = 0; 
 int k_address = 0; 
 for(i;i < 10;i++){ 
  k_address = os_type[i] - KERNEL_OFFSET; 






Gets the process located at the process address from the raw memory 
image. 
Input: File, Size, Process Offset, empty Eprocess Block 
Output: Eprocess block 
**********************************************************************/ 
void get_process(FILE *in,long size, int procAddr, struct EPROCESS 
*proc) { 
 fseek(in,procAddr,SEEK_SET); 





Dumps the process memory from the Page Directory. 
Input: File, Page File, Size, Process offset as char 
Output: Process report and memory contents to file 
**********************************************************************/ 
void dump_process_memory(FILE *in, FILE *pageFile, long size, char 
*process_address) { 
   long procAddr = hstr_i(process_address); //0x21fe020 notepad.exe 
laptopMem.dump 
 struct EPROCESS *proc; 
 proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
 get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc); 
 if(check_process(proc) == 1){ 
  printf("    |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s 
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","       Time","  Offset","    PDB"); 
  printf("     --------------------  -------  -------  ------
------------------ ------------ ------------  \n"); 
  print_process_report(proc, 0, procAddr); 
  printf("\n"); 
  get_memory(proc, in, pageFile, size); 
    free(proc); 
  printf("\n\n"); 
 } 
 else { 
  printf("Process not Found!"); 





Gets the number of pages in memory. 
Input: File, Page File, Size, Process offset as char 
Output: Memory Stats 
**********************************************************************/ 
void get_process_memory_stats(FILE *in,FILE *pageFile, long size, char 
*process_address) { 
   long procAddr = hstr_i(process_address); 
 struct EPROCESS *proc; 
 proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
 get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc); 
 if(check_process(proc) == 1){ 
  printf("    |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s 
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","       Time","  Offset","    PDB"); 
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  printf("     --------------------  -------  -------  ------
------------------ ------------ ------------  \n"); 
  print_process_report(proc, 0, procAddr); 
  get_memory_stats(proc, in, pageFile, size); 
    free(proc); 
  printf("\n\n"); 
 } 
 else { 
  printf("Process not Found!"); 





Translates Virtual addresses to Physical Addresses. 
Input: File, Size, Process offset as char 
Output: Physical offset 
**********************************************************************/ 
void translate_address(FILE *in, long size, char *pAddr, char *vAddr) { 
   long procAddr = hstr_i(pAddr); 
 long virtAddr = hstr_i(vAddr); 
 struct EPROCESS *proc; 
 if(virtAddr == 0){ 
  printf("Not a Valid Address\n"); 
  exit(0); 
 } 
 proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
 get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc); 
 if(check_process(proc) == 1){ 
  printf("    |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s 
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","       Time","  Offset","    PDB"); 
  printf("     --------------------  -------  -------  ------
------------------ ------------ ------------  \n"); 
  print_process_report(proc, 0, procAddr); 
  printf("\n"); 
  printf("Virtual Address:\t\t0x%.8x\n",virtAddr); 
  printf("Physical 
Address:\t\t0x%.8x\n",virtual_to_physical(virtAddr,proc-
>Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size)); 
    free(proc); 
  printf("\n\n"); 
 } 
 else { 
  printf("Process not Found!"); 





Given the pointer to the first process in the active process list, this  
function follows the list of active processes.  Default value for the  
pointer is 0.  If a valid process is not found it will continue to 
search 
the image from the address of the pointer. 
Input: File, Size, Process offset 
Output: List of processes 
**********************************************************************/ 
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void process_list(FILE * in,long size,long pAddr) { 
   struct EPROCESS *proc; 
   int count = 0; 
 long procAddr = 0; 
 procAddr = get_active_process_head(in, pAddr); 
 proc = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
 get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc); 
 if((check_process(proc) == 1) && (strcmp(proc-
>ImageFileName,"System") == 0)) { 
  printf("    |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s 
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","       Time","  Offset","    PDB"); 
  printf("     --------------------  -------  -------  ------
------------------ ------------ ------------  \n"); 
  print_process_report(proc, count, procAddr); 
    while(1) { 
   count++; 
   procAddr = virtual_to_physical((long) proc-
>ActiveProcessLinks.Flink,proc->Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0],in, size)-
0x88; 
   get_process(in, size, procAddr, proc); 
   if(check_process(proc) != 1) 
    break; 
   print_process_report(proc, count, procAddr); 
  } 
 } else { 
  printf("System process not found"); 
  exit(0); 
 } 






Identifies the name and size of the memory image. 
Input: File, path to image, size 
Output: Name and Size 
**********************************************************************/ 
void identify_image(FILE * in, char *name,long size){ 
 char * format =  
      "\nImage name: %21s\n" 
      "Image Size: %12d Bytes\n\n"; 




Scans the image for process objects. 
Input: file and size 
Output: process scan 
**********************************************************************/ 
void process_scan(FILE * in,long size) { 
 int count = 0; 
 int offset = 0; 
 struct EPROCESS *procTest; 
 procTest = malloc(sizeof(struct EPROCESS)); 
 printf("    |%-20s|%8s|%8s|%-25s| %-10s | %-10s 
|\n","Name","Pid","PPid","       Time","  Offset","    PDB"); 
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 printf("     --------------------  -------  -------  ------------
------------ ------------ ------------  \n"); 
 while(!feof(in)){ 
  get_process(in, size, offset, procTest); 
  if(check_process(procTest) == 1){ 
   print_process_report(procTest, count, offset); 
   count++; 
  } 









int main( int argc, char **argv ) { 
  
 int c = 0; 
     FILE * imgFile = NULL; 
 FILE * pageFile = NULL; 
 long  procAddr = 0; 
 if(argc < 3){ 
  print_usage(); 
  exit(0); 
 } 
     imgFile = fopen(argv[2],"rb"); 
 if( imgFile == NULL ){ 
        fprintf(stderr,"Error: Could not open 
%s!\n",argv[2]); 
  exit(0); 
     } 
 int fileSize = file_size(imgFile); 
 identify_image(imgFile,argv[2],fileSize); 
 while ((c = getopt (argc, argv, "lstdipm")) != -1) 
  switch (c) { 
   case 'l': 
    if(argc > 3){ 
     procAddr = hstr_i(argv[3]); 
    } 
    process_list(imgFile, fileSize, procAddr); 
    break; 
   case 's': 
    process_scan(imgFile, fileSize); 
                break; 
   case 't': 
    if(argc > 4){ 
     translate_address(imgFile, fileSize, 
argv[3],argv[4]); 
    } else print_usage(); 
                break; 
   case 'd': 
    if((argc > 4) && (strcmp(argv[4],"-pages") == 
0)) { 
     dump_process_image(imgFile, fileSize, 
argv[3], 1); 
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    } else dump_process_image(imgFile, fileSize, 
argv[3], 0); 
                break; 
   case 'i': 
    if((argc > 3) && (strcmp(argv[3],"-verbose") == 
0)) { 
     osid(imgFile, fileSize, 1); 
    } else osid(imgFile, fileSize, 0); 
                break; 
   case 'p': 
    get_process_memory_stats(imgFile, pageFile, 
fileSize, argv[3]); 
                break; 
   case 'm': 
    if(argc > 4){ 
     pageFile = fopen(argv[4],"rb"); 
    } 
    dump_process_memory(imgFile, pageFile, 
fileSize, argv[3]); 
                break; 
   default: 
    print_usage(); 
    break; 
  } 
     fclose(imgFile); 
     return 0; 
} 
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APPENDIX C. TEST RESULTS 
A. TEST RESULTS 
Eproc.exe has been tested against WPMOA [7] and Volatility [4].  The table below 
shows the results of the tests.  
 
These tests show that processes that have been exited or removed from  the active process 
list by some other means can be found by scanning the image for process block structures 
and that it gives a better picture of what was running on the system at the time the image 
was taken.  This is a more forensically sound method of finding the processes in a 
memory image.  The next test is the memory retrieved using Eproc over WPMOA [7].  
The later used the working set list to find memory pages used by a process and only 
found 20 MB of memory for notepad.exe.  Eproc on the other hand dumps all non-global 
pages from the page directory and when combined with the more robust method of 
address translation mentioned above was able to locate 87 MB of data.  Improvements 
over WPMOA are an algorithm built in that will locate the Active Process List head, a 
scanning function used to locate processes not it the list, processing  of PE header 
information, the ability to locate data in the swap file if available. 
B. SAMPLE OUTPUT 
1. Process List 
Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump 
Image Size:    536776704 Bytes 
 
    |Name                |     Pid|    PPid|       Time              |   Offset   |     PDB    | 
     --------------------  -------  -------  ------------------------ ------------ ------------   
  0 |System              |       4|       0|  2009-04-22 19:24:48    | 0x023ca830 | 0x00039000 | 
  1 |smss.exe            |    1628|       4|  2007-08-24 22:10:52    | 0x021bb8f8 | 0x18a12000 | 
  2 |csrss.exe           |    1700|    1628|  2007-08-24 22:10:54    | 0x020adc08 | 0x1ac4b000 | 
  3 |winlogon.exe        |    1724|    1628|  2007-08-24 22:11:01    | 0x0228b2c8 | 0x1efb0000 | 
  4 |services.exe        |    1768|    1724|  2007-08-24 22:11:02    | 0x022851f8 | 0x1f0fc000 | 
  5 |lsass.exe           |    1780|    1724|  2007-08-24 22:11:02    | 0x0213dda0 | 0x1f0b6000 | 
  6 |svchost.exe         |    1948|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:05    | 0x02260c40 | 0x1f7a8000 | 
  7 |svchost.exe         |    1996|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x02124da0 | 0x1f8b2000 | 
  8 |svchost.exe         |     492|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x021a1020 | 0x1fb38000 | 
  9 |svchost.exe         |     612|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x021355f8 | 0x1fce0000 | 
 10 |svchost.exe         |     840|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:07    | 0x021bfda0 | 0x0073a000 | 
Test  Eproc WPMOA [7] Volatility [4] 
List  38 procs 38 procs 38 procs 
Scan  78 procs N/A 75 procs 
Mem dump Notepad.exe 87 MB 20 MB N/A 
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 11 |ccSetMgr.exe        |    1120|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x02123358 | 0x0394f000 | 
 12 |explorer.exe        |    1228|    1168|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x02280460 | 0x08dc3000 | 
 13 |ccEvtMgr.exe        |    1248|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x01fae638 | 0x03f80000 | 
 14 |spoolsv.exe         |    1448|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:09    | 0x020ecbe0 | 0x0b648000 | 
 15 |DefWatch.exe        |    1680|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x01ee4518 | 0x0c27f000 | 
 16 |GoogleUpdaterSe     |    1848|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x01fb9478 | 0x0c224000 | 
 17 |mdm.exe             |    1912|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x0226ac78 | 0x0c209000 | 
 18 |svchost.exe         |     284|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x02105be0 | 0x0d6f1000 | 
 19 |Rtvscan.exe         |     692|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:24    | 0x01f08be0 | 0x0d8f5000 | 
 20 |vmware-authd.ex     |     728|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01eecda0 | 0x0da7b000 | 
 21 |vmount2.exe         |     796|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01f1d258 | 0x0dc76000 | 
 22 |vmnat.exe           |     772|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01ec9c10 | 0x0deae000 | 
 23 |vmnetdhcp.exe       |    1824|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01e20a28 | 0x0df63000 | 
 24 |vmserverdWin32.     |     356|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:25    | 0x01e076a0 | 0x0f366000 | 
 25 |alg.exe             |    3088|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:33    | 0x01df35e8 | 0x1186c000 | 
 26 |ccApp.exe           |    3580|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:35    | 0x01e34020 | 0x12025000 | 
 27 |VPTray.exe          |    3812|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:36    | 0x021e1738 | 0x1447d000 | 
 28 |acrotray.exe        |    3820|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:36    | 0x01f11da0 | 0x14e91000 | 
 29 |jusched.exe         |    3924|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:40    | 0x01ef3438 | 0x131e6000 | 
 30 |ctfmon.exe          |    1136|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:42    | 0x020dd558 | 0x1411e000 | 
 31 |GoogleUpdater.e     |    2300|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:44    | 0x01de9a68 | 0x14e8b000 | 
 32 |FNPLicensingSer     |    2728|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:50    | 0x01eef530 | 0x1c4c8000 | 
 33 |cmd.exe             |     984|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:13:16    | 0x01fad820 | 0x03d23000 | 
 34 |bash.exe            |    1092|     984|  2007-08-24 22:13:17    | 0x01e53020 | 0x1577a000 | 
 35 |firefox.exe         |    2440|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:24:30    | 0x01dd3a60 | 0x0a62d000 | 
 36 |notepad.exe         |     720|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:24:46    | 0x021fe020 | 0x0cb45000 | 
 37 |cmd.exe             |    2892|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:25:11    | 0x01da9248 | 0x1e3e0000 | 
 38 |dd.exe              |    2232|    2892|  2007-08-24 23:26:55    | 0x01d7d020 | 0x0c4aa000 | 
2. Process Scan 
Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump 
Image Size:    536776704 Bytes 
 
    |Name                |     Pid|    PPid|       Time              |   Offset   |     PDB    | 
     --------------------  -------  -------  ------------------------ ------------ ------------ 
  0 |Idle                |       0|       0|  2009-04-22 19:24:48    | 0x00559080 | 0x00039000 | 
  1 |dd.exe              |    2232|    2892|  2007-08-24 23:26:55    | 0x01d7d020 | 0x0c4aa000 | 
  2 |cmd.exe             |    2492|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:24:48    | 0x01d846b0 | 0x07a74000 | 
  3 |cmd.exe             |    2892|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:25:11    | 0x01da9248 | 0x1e3e0000 | 
  4 |bash.exe            |    2404|    1092|  2007-08-24 23:18:09    | 0x01dc8218 | 0x06c32000 | 
  5 |firefox.exe         |    2440|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:24:30    | 0x01dd3a60 | 0x0a62d000 | 
  6 |GoogleUpdater.e     |    2300|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:44    | 0x01de9a68 | 0x14e8b000 | 
  7 |alg.exe             |    3088|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:33    | 0x01df35e8 | 0x1186c000 | 
  8 |vmserverdWin32.     |     356|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:25    | 0x01e076a0 | 0x0f366000 | 
  9 |vmnetdhcp.exe       |    1824|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01e20a28 | 0x0df63000 | 
 10 |ccApp.exe           |    3580|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:35    | 0x01e34020 | 0x12025000 | 
 11 |bash.exe            |    1092|     984|  2007-08-24 22:13:17    | 0x01e53020 | 0x1577a000 | 
 12 |vmnat.exe           |     772|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01ec9c10 | 0x0deae000 | 
 13 |DefWatch.exe        |    1680|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x01ee4518 | 0x0c27f000 | 
 14 |vmware-authd.ex     |     728|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01eecda0 | 0x0da7b000 | 
 15 |FNPLicensingSer     |    2728|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:50    | 0x01eef530 | 0x1c4c8000 | 
 16 |jusched.exe         |    3924|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:40    | 0x01ef3438 | 0x131e6000 | 
 17 |Rtvscan.exe         |     692|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:24    | 0x01f08be0 | 0x0d8f5000 | 
 18 |acrotray.exe        |    3820|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:36    | 0x01f11da0 | 0x14e91000 | 
 19 |vmount2.exe         |     796|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x01f1d258 | 0x0dc76000 | 
 20 |cmd.exe             |     984|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:13:16    | 0x01fad820 | 0x03d23000 | 
 21 |ccEvtMgr.exe        |    1248|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x01fae638 | 0x03f80000 | 
 22 |GoogleUpdaterSe     |    1848|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x01fb9478 | 0x0c224000 | 
 23 |csrss.exe           |    1700|    1628|  2007-08-24 22:10:54    | 0x020adc08 | 0x1ac4b000 | 
 24 |ctfmon.exe          |    1136|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:42    | 0x020dd558 | 0x1411e000 | 
 25 |spoolsv.exe         |    1448|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:09    | 0x020ecbe0 | 0x0b648000 | 
 26 |svchost.exe         |     284|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x02105be0 | 0x0d6f1000 | 
 27 |ccSetMgr.exe        |    1120|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x02123358 | 0x0394f000 | 
 28 |svchost.exe         |    1996|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x02124da0 | 0x1f8b2000 | 
 29 |svchost.exe         |     612|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x021355f8 | 0x1fce0000 | 
 30 |lsass.exe           |    1780|    1724|  2007-08-24 22:11:02    | 0x0213dda0 | 0x1f0b6000 | 
 31 |svchost.exe         |     492|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x021a1020 | 0x1fb38000 | 
 32 |smss.exe            |    1628|       4|  2007-08-24 22:10:52    | 0x021bb8f8 | 0x18a12000 | 
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 33 |svchost.exe         |     840|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:07    | 0x021bfda0 | 0x0073a000 | 
 34 |VPTray.exe          |    3812|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:36    | 0x021e1738 | 0x1447d000 | 
 35 |dd.exe              |    3284|    2404|  2007-08-24 23:18:09    | 0x021f30e8 | 0x1f71f000 | 
 36 |notepad.exe         |     720|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:24:46    | 0x021fe020 | 0x0cb45000 | 
 37 |svchost.exe         |    1948|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:05    | 0x02260c40 | 0x1f7a8000 | 
 38 |mdm.exe             |    1912|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x0226ac78 | 0x0c209000 | 
 39 |explorer.exe        |    1228|    1168|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x02280460 | 0x08dc3000 | 
 40 |services.exe        |    1768|    1724|  2007-08-24 22:11:02    | 0x022851f8 | 0x1f0fc000 | 
 41 |winlogon.exe        |    1724|    1628|  2007-08-24 22:11:01    | 0x0228b2c8 | 0x1efb0000 | 
 42 |Acrobat.exe         |    1332|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:22:37    | 0x022f27b8 | 0x0924c000 | 
 43 |System              |       4|       0|  2009-04-22 19:24:48    | 0x023ca830 | 0x00039000 | 
 44 |svchost.exe         |    1948|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:05    | 0x0257ec40 | 0x1f7a8000 | 
 45 |jusched.exe         |    3924|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:40    | 0x03416438 | 0x131e6000 | 
 46 |ccSetMgr.exe        |    1120|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x040bd358 | 0x0394f000 | 
 47 |bash.exe            |    2404|    1092|  2007-08-24 23:18:09    | 0x04229218 | 0x06c32000 | 
 48 |GoogleUpdaterSe     |    1848|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x045ad478 | 0x0c224000 | 
 49 |notepad.exe         |     720|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:24:46    | 0x046db020 | 0x0cb45000 | 
 50 |vmserverdWin32.     |     356|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:25    | 0x059886a0 | 0x0f366000 | 
 51 |bash.exe            |    2404|    1092|  2007-08-24 23:18:09    | 0x06043218 | 0x06c32000 | 
 52 |mdm.exe             |    1912|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x07488c78 | 0x0c209000 | 
 53 |ccEvtMgr.exe        |    1248|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x08052638 | 0x03f80000 | 
 54 |Acrobat.exe         |    1332|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:22:37    | 0x083017b8 | 0x0924c000 | 
 55 |                    |       4|       0|  2009-04-22 19:24:48    | 0x09341998 | 0x00039000 | 
 56 |Acrobat.exe         |    1332|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:22:37    | 0x0a7ed7b8 | 0x0924c000 | 
 57 |ccSetMgr.exe        |    1120|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x0a8a3358 | 0x0394f000 | 
 58 |ccEvtMgr.exe        |    1248|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x0a908638 | 0x03f80000 | 
 59 |                    |       4|       0|  2009-04-22 19:24:48    | 0x0ae10998 | 0x00039000 | 
 60 |explorer.exe        |    1228|    1168|  2007-08-24 22:11:08    | 0x0ae8e460 | 0x08dc3000 | 
 61 |FNPLicensingSer     |    2728|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:12:50    | 0x0b3b2530 | 0x1c4c8000 | 
 62 |VPTray.exe          |    3812|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:36    | 0x0b47e738 | 0x1447d000 | 
 63 |ccApp.exe           |    3580|    1228|  2007-08-24 22:12:35    | 0x0c096020 | 0x12025000 | 
 64 |bash.exe            |    1092|     984|  2007-08-24 22:13:17    | 0x0ccc5020 | 0x1577a000 | 
 65 |                    |       4|       0|  2009-04-22 19:24:48    | 0x0cd1f998 | 0x00039000 | 
 66 |spoolsv.exe         |    1448|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:09    | 0x0d055be0 | 0x0b648000 | 
 67 |svchost.exe         |     492|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x0e8bc020 | 0x1fb38000 | 
 68 |vmware-authd.ex     |     728|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x0ea4fda0 | 0x0da7b000 | 
 69 |csrss.exe           |    1700|    1628|  2007-08-24 22:10:54    | 0x0ed23c08 | 0x1ac4b000 | 
 70 |vmnat.exe           |     772|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x0ee9cc10 | 0x0deae000 | 
 71 |svchost.exe         |     284|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x0f08fbe0 | 0x0d6f1000 | 
 72 |bash.exe            |    2404|    1092|  2007-08-24 23:18:09    | 0x0f6a5218 | 0x06c32000 | 
 73 |vmount2.exe         |     796|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:25    | 0x0fa90258 | 0x0dc76000 | 
 74 |winlogon.exe        |    1724|    1628|  2007-08-24 22:11:01    | 0x0fc692c8 | 0x1efb0000 | 
 75 |svchost.exe         |     612|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:06    | 0x0fccf5f8 | 0x1fce0000 | 
 76 |GoogleUpdaterSe     |    1848|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x0feee478 | 0x0c224000 | 
 77 |DefWatch.exe        |    1680|    1768|  2007-08-24 22:11:18    | 0x0ff97518 | 0x0c27f000 | 
 78 |notepad.exe         |     720|    1228|  2007-08-24 23:24:46    | 0x10c9e020 | 0x0cb45000 | 
3. Process Information 
Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump 
Image Size:    536776704 Bytes 
 
    |Name                |     Pid|    PPid|       Time              |   Offset   |     PDB    | 
     --------------------  -------  -------  ------------------------ ------------ ------------   
  0 |bash.exe            |    1092|     984|  2007-08-24 22:13:17    | 0x01e53020 | 0x1577a000 | 
 
Imgage Base Offset:             0x1b393000 
 
  DOS Header 
e_magic:                        0x5a4d 
e_lfanew:                       0x80 
SIGNATURE:                      0x4550 
 
  File Header 
Machine Type:                   IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 
Number of Sections:             5 
Time Stamp:                     2009-04-22 19:26:45     












  Optional Header 
Magic Number:                   0x10b 
Subsystem:                      IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI 
Image Base Address:             0x400000 
Address of Entry Point:         0x1000 (RVA) 
Code Base Address:              0x1000 (RVA) 
Data Base Address:              0x5b000 (RVA) 
Major OS Version:               4 
Minor OS Version:               0 
Size of Stack Reserved:         0x200000 (2097152 bytes) 
Number of RVA and Sizes:        0x10 
 
  Data Directory Information 
 
Data Directory                  RVA            Size       
--------------                  ---            ----       
Import Directory                0x00076000     0x00003e3c 
 
  Section Information 
 
Name     Virt Size   Virt Addr   rData Ofs   rData Size  Char 
----     ---------   ---------   ---------   ----------  ---- 
.text    0x00059200  0x00001000  0x00059400  0x00000400  0xe0000020 
.data    0x00002400  0x0005b000  0x00002400  0x00059800  0xc0000040 
.rdata   0x00013000  0x0005e000  0x00013200  0x0005bc00  0x40000040 
.bss     0x00003200  0x00072000  0x00000000  0x00000000  0xc0000080 
.idata   0x00003e00  0x00076000  0x00004000  0x0006ee00  0xc0000040 
4. Operating System Identification -Verbose 
Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump 
Image Size:    536776704 Bytes 
 
Windows XP Service Pack 2 
 
Image Base Offset:             0x4d7000 
 
  DOS Header 
e_magic:                        0x5a4d 
e_lfanew:                       0xe8 
SIGNATURE:                      0x4550 
  File Header 
Machine Type:                   IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 
Number of Sections:             21 
Time Stamp:                     2009-04-22 19:26:45     








  Optional Header 
Magic Number:                   0x10b 
Subsystem:                      IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE 
Image Base Address:             0x400000 
Address of Entry Point:         0x1d55ce (RVA) 
Code Base Address:              0x580 (RVA) 
Data Base Address:              0x6a400 (RVA) 
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Major OS Version:               5 
Minor OS Version:               1 
Size of Stack Reserved:         0x40000 (262144 bytes) 
Number of RVA and Sizes:        0x10 
 
  Data Directory Information 
 
Data Directory                  RVA            Size       
--------------                  ---            ----       
Export Directory                0x001aa380     0x0000b55d 
Import Directory                0x001f3a24     0x00000050 
Resource Directory              0x001f4380     0x00010708 
Base Relocation Table           0x00204b00     0x0000f984 
Debug Directory                 0x00071f00     0x00000038 
Load Configuration Directory    0x000535a0     0x00000040 
 
  Section Information 
 
Name     Virt Size   Virt Addr   rData Ofs   rData Size  Char 
----     ---------   ---------   ---------   ----------  ---- 
.text    0x00071900  0x00000580  0x00071a00  0x00000580  0x68000020 
POOLMI   0x00001200  0x00071f80  0x00001300  0x00071f80  0x68000020 
MISYSPTE 0x00000700  0x00073280  0x00000700  0x00073280  0x68000020 
POOLCODE 0x00001500  0x00073980  0x00001600  0x00073980  0x68000020 
.data    0x00016c00  0x00074f80  0x00016d00  0x00074f80  0xc8000040 
PAGE     0x000f8e00  0x0008bc80  0x000f8e80  0x0008bc80  0x60000020 
PAGEVRFY 0x0000f100  0x00192e80  0x0000f200  0x00192e80  0x60000020 
PAGEWMI  0x00001700  0x001a2080  0x00001800  0x001a2080  0x60000020 
PAGEKD   0x00004000  0x001a3880  0x00004080  0x001a3880  0x60000020 
.edata   0x0000b500  0x001aa380  0x0000b580  0x001aa380  0x40000040 
PAGEDATA 0x00001500  0x001b5900  0x00001580  0x001b5900  0xc0000040 
PAGEKD   0x0000c000  0x001b6e80  0x0000c080  0x001b6e80  0xc0000040 
PAGECONS 0x00000100  0x001c2f00  0x00000200  0x001c2f00  0xc0000040 
PAGEVRFC 0x00003400  0x001c3100  0x00003480  0x001c3100  0x40000040 
PAGEVRFD 0x00000600  0x001c6580  0x00000680  0x001c6580  0xc0000040 
INIT     0x0002d700  0x001c6c00  0x0002d780  0x001c6c00  0xe2000020 
.rsrc    0x00010700  0x001f4380  0x00010780  0x001f4380  0x40000040 
.reloc   0x0000f900  0x00204b00  0x0000fa00  0x00204b00  0x42000040 
5. Memory Statistics 
Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump 
Image Size:    536776704 Bytes 
 
    |Name                |     Pid|    PPid|       Time              |   Offset   |     PDB    | 
     --------------------  -------  -------  ------------------------ ------------ ------------   
  0 |dd.exe              |    2232|    2892|  2007-08-24 23:26:55    | 0x01d7d020 | 0x0c4aa000 | 
 
Valid  2020 
Prototype 50966 
Global  32156 
Paged  8400 
Unknown  324 
6. Address Translation 
Image name: /home/jstimson/Images/laptopMem.dump 
Image Size:    536776704 Bytes 
 
    |Name                |     Pid|    PPid|       Time              |   Offset   |     PDB    | 
     --------------------  -------  -------  ------------------------ ------------ ------------   
  0 |dd.exe              |    2232|    2892|  2007-08-24 23:26:55    | 0x01d7d020 | 0x0c4aa000 | 
 
Virtual Address:  0x00407000 
Physical Address:  0x04a1a000 
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